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THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 


BY 
.JOSEPH W. RICH 
b911 BY !cm BWTI! 
S'I1)aCAL 8- OF IOWA 
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 
In the Battle of Shiloh there is much to interest 
the student of Iowa history. This Btate had more 
men in the conflict, in proportion to its population, 
than any other. Eleven Iowa regiments of infan- 
try were engaged, namely: the Second, the Third, 
the Sixth, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Eleventh, 
the Twelfth, the Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, the 
Fifteenth, and the Sixteenth. Besides these regi- 
ments there were in the Twenty-fifth Missouri, 
which was the regiment that furnished the recon- 
noitering party sent out on Sunday morning, April 
6th, three Iowa companies, namely: Company F, 
Company I, and Company K. 
The Sixth Iowa Regiment claims the distinction 
of being the first regiment to disembark at  Pitts- 
burg Landing, and the Eighth claims the distinction 
of being the last regiment to retire from the line jn 
the'Hornets9 Nest. Five Iowa regiments were in 
the Hornets' Nest; and three of the number, the 
Eighth, the Twelfth, and the Fourteenth, were cap- 
tured. All  of the other Iowa regiments were in the 
thick of the conflict on Sunday. 
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Before the close of the war there were promotions 
of both officers and men from among those engagedb , 
in the Battle of Shiloh; while several participants 
attained civil distinction during and after the war, 
Major Wm. M. Stone of the Third Regiment and ' 
Lieutenant Buren R. Sherman of the Thirteentkn,l 
Regiment served the State as Governor. Sherman 
served as Auditor of State three terms before be-r 
coming Governor. Major W. W. Belknap of the 
Fifteenth Regiment became Secretary of War ; and: 
Lieutenant David B. Henderson of the Twelfth 
Regiment, after long service in the lower house of 
Congress, became Speaker. Many others from 
Iowa who engaged in the bat;tle served the State 
in the General Assembly, in Congress, and in other 
official stations of responsibility. 
Mr. Joseph W. Rich, the author of this mono- 
grap$ was himself a participant in the battle as a 
me*= of Company E of the Twelfth Iowa Regi- 
ment. H e  had enlisted on October 1,1861, for the 
term of three years; but about the middle of his 
term of service he was discharged from the hospital 
on surgeon's certificate of disability. Having been 
on the field during both days of the battle and hav- 
ing subsequently (in 1908) gone over the ground 
with Major D. W. Reed, Secretary of the Shiloh 
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National Military Park Commission, Mr. Rich has 
been able to b d g  to these pages the first-hand in- 
formation of an eye witness as well as the evidences 
of documentary sources. 
This account of the Battle of Shiloh ftrst ap- 
peared in the October, 1909, number of The Iowa  
JwmZ of History cwld Politics, and has received 
most favorable comment from such men as General 
lbderick D. Grant, General Grenville M. Dodge, 
Glenera1 Charles Morton, and General John H. 
Stibbs. Indeed, it is not often that a writer of his- 
tory succeeds in being so accurate in his presenta- 
tion of facts and so fair and non-partisan in his 
judgments as to satisfy those who, as participants in 
or as special students of the events described, have 
or believe they have first-hand information. Mr. 
Rich is, therefore, to be congratulated upon the uni- 
formly favorable criticism which followed the first 
appearance of his monograph. 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
No apology is offered for the appearance of an- 
other paper on the Battle of Shiloh, for the reason 
that the last word to be said on the subject has not 
been said, and indeed will not have been said until 
the last serious misrepresentation, made through 
ignorance, prejudice, malice, or for any other rea- 
son, has been corrected. It is not in the thought of 
the writer that he will be able to contribute addi- 
tional facts to the literature of the subject; but it 
is hoped that the facts may be so grouped and illus- 
trated as to leave a clearer picture of the battle in 
the mind of the reader. 
As far as the writer knows the movements of the 
battle on Sunday, April 6,1862, have not heretofore 
been illustrated except by means of one general 
map, showing progressive movements of the battle 
lines throughout the day. Such a map can be little 
beger than a puzzle-picture to the general reader. 
The original map from which the tracings were 
made to illustrate the Battle of Shiloh was prepared 
under direction of the Shiloh National Militav 
Park Commission, to accompany its account of the 
battle, entitled The Battle of SMoh a d  the O r g m  
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inratiow Eragag&, compiled from official records by 
Major D. W. Reed, Btorian and Elecretary of the 
ComnMon. To insure a c c k c y  in the original 
map, the field was carefully platted by the Commis- 
sion'~ engineer, Mr. Atwell Thompson, and the 
camps and battle lines were located by Major D. 
W. Beed, after an exhaustive study of official docu- 
ments, aided by the recollections of mores of officers 
and men engaged in the battle on fhe respective 
sides. The reader must remember, however, that 
the lines were never for a moment stationary, so 
that it would be a phys id  impossibility to repre- 
sent them correctly at short htemb of time. The 
analysis here given of the genera1 map pubWed by 
the C b d o n ,  it is bebed,  will atid materially 
in undemhnding the battle. &hiL , 
Though not offering an apology for this paper, 
the writer is &pawl fo justify its appearance 
somewhat by referring briefly, by way of introduc- 
tion, to a few illustrative errors an8 misrepreaen- 
tations sought to be corrected, pointing out some of 
the so-called histories and memoirs where they are 
to be found. Of course it is not to be presumed 
b t  these errors and misrepresentations were in- 
tentional : they are due .mainly to two causes - to 
the "smart" newspaper correspondent, whose main 
object was sensation ; and to the unreliable historian 
whose main weakness was indolence in searching 
8 .  8 8 ,  
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I for facts. Prejudice may in a few cases have con- tributed to the pollution of the historic stream. Special acknowledgments are due from the I writer to Major D. W. Reed, Secretary and His- 
I tor- of the Shiloh National Military Park Com- 
I 
mission, for valuable suggestions in the preparation 
of this paper. The writer is also under obligations 
to Lieutenant Wm. J. Hahn of Omaha, Nebraska, 
a member of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, who was 
of thi  Major Powell reconnoitering party, sent out 
by Colonel Peabody on Sunday morning, April 6th ; 
and also to T. W. Holman of Rutledge, Missouri, 
who was a member of the Twenty-first Missouri In- 
fantry and was with the regiment when it went out 
to reiinforce the reconnoitering party and the 
pickets. 
JOSEPH W. RICH 
TEE STATE HISTOBICAL S O C ~ T Y  OF IOWA 
Iowa CITY 
-i- 
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THE BATTLE OF SHILOH 
One of the worst as it was one of the fh t  of the 
sensational stories of the Battle of Shiloh put in 
historic form was the account by Horace ~ r e e l e ~  in 
his American, Con,flct, The camp a t  Pittsburg 
Landing before the battle is likened to a Methodist 
campmeeting, and the Union army on Sunday 
morning is represented as a "bewildered, half- 
dressed, . . . . helpless, ooatless, musketless mob", 
upon which the enemy sprang "with the bayonet". 
This account has Prentiss 's division " routed before 
it had time to form a line of battle ;" and Sherman's 
division is "out of the fight by 8 o'clock".' 
J. 8. C. Abbott in his story of the Battle of Shgoh 
as given in his two-volume History of the Civil War, 
gathered his material from the same sensational 
sources and he used it in the same sensational way 
as did Mr. Greeley. 
A more pretentious work, which appeared much 
later, was Scribners' Histor9 of the Uruited States 
in five volumes. This work appeared after original 
sources of inf orination had become easily accessible ; 
and yet in its account of the Battle of Shiloh it is 
the sinner of sinners for untruthfulness. It is no 
. I, "  1 Y'. 
...,,. i IM I . I - C , L H  . 
- .  
were engaged in the ba 
a t  the close of the day. 
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, fight on sunday night ; and he figures that not more 
than fim thousand of Grant's five di*io~, which 
ere engaged in the battle On Sunday, Were in line 
- 
, , , john r b k e  is another writer on Civil War sub- 
j&, and in his Mississippi vtIzk3y the oiviz war 
another of tihe ~ e ~ t i o n a l  type, though of pre- . ~ j  he describes the Battle of Shiloh, but not without 
r serious errors. For instance he attri- . -3'. : tentiow title, is Headley 's History of the BebeZ&on. 
, 
his superior, General Halleck. He says 
that &11eral McClernand was the r a m g  officer 
like a herd of sheep". unfortunately for the r e p  at Pibburg  Landing in General &ant's absenm, 
u M o n  of Mr. Headley as a historian, the fads are 
, 
k not correct - General Sheman was the 
an against him -he dowed himself to be misled 
i,," 
m- officer, He makes no mention of the re- 
by the fiction-writers. comoitering party that went out from I '~entk's  
John Codman Ropes, who enjoys something of a 'S division before daylight on Sunday but 
as a critical writer, in his recent story of , that &'when the Confederates athcked in full 
the Wm, pubkhed by the Mam&uSeh H&- force on Sunday morning, the F d e r a k  Were in 
camp and not in line of battle. " o n  the same page' 
c l o s d ~  the account as given by &neral Bueu, in e gives himself a tht C0~~radiction by 
shitoh Beviewed; and he shows, also, a prejudiced ' entiss had formed line and dvztnced 
judgment a g a h t  Grant and in favor of Buen - a quarter of a mile, where he received ‘‘the 
whom he evidently admired. Mr. Ropes makes it of .the Confederates" - and the time he *es 
aPPmr that none of the divisions near the Landing . : at abut half past five o'clock, which is an error of ' 
were in line until after Sherman and Prentiss had fully two hours. 
fallen back from their first lines, a b u t  ten a. m. ' on one page he gives the strength of the Chnfed- 
He leaves it to be iIIkt%d also that BueU had an en- brate army as 36,000, exclusive of cavalry, and On 
tire dkkion w the west side of the river and in the another page his “reckoning " k 30,000 on the me 
lt o  we ine 
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basis. He criticises General Johnston for giving 
so much attention to the divisions of Prentiss and 
Sherman, at  the opening of the battle, when he 
should have massed heavily against Stuart, the ex- 
treme left of the Union line, forgetting, if he ever 
knew, that Prentiss and Sherman must be forced 
back before Stuart could be attacked. The plan 
suggested by Fiske would have exposed the Con- 
federate flank to the two divisions of Prentiss and 
Sherman, which would have been a blunder. The 
corps organization of the Confederate army ap- 
pears, by inference, to have been well maintained; 
whereas they began to commingle at  the beginning 
of the battle, and the corps were practically broken 
up by ten o'clock. 
Mr. Fiske is again in error in leaving the infer- 
ence that an entire brigade of Nelson's division was 
in at  the close of the fight on Sunday night. And 
still another error is the statement that three Con- 
federate 
near the 
brigades 
landing. 
Mpal 
gives 
;ed 
the 
in the last at 
number of gw 
Grant's last line far below the facts, and then specu- 
lates upon what might have been if General Beaure- 
gard could have "put 6,000 to 8,000 fresh reserves 1 
into the fight against his weary antagonist ", appar- 
ently never thinking. of the converse of the specu- 
lation. Mr. Fiske appears to be particularly unfor- 
tunate in the handling of statistics. He makes it 
,-=-.r r , ,  
A, 
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appear that Lew. Wallace brought 7,000 men to 
Grant's right, and Nelson about the same number 
to his left, on Sunday night - an error of 4,000 or 
more. If  Mr. Fiske had twted less to 8Kloh R e  
dewad and more to official records, he would have 
' made fewer mistakes. 
Henry Villard, who was a newspaper correspond- 
Buell's army, has written what he calls 
"Memoirs", and "in order to impart greater accu- 
mcy and perhaps some novelty", to his cLsketch" 
of the Battle of Bhiloh, he goes to Confederate re- 
ports for his information. His "sketch" abounds 
.in errors, even to the misquoting of one of General 
Grant's dispatches, thus changing a negative to an 
afbmative statement. 
Aa recently as 1895 a Brevet Brigadier General, 
U. 8. V., Henry M. Gist, in his A m  of the Cam- 
berZa.nd, quotes approvingly from Comte de Paris's 
History of the Civil War as follows : "At the sight 
of the enemy's batteries advancing in good order, 
the soldiers that have been grouped together Sn 
haste, to give an air of support to Webster's bat- 
teries, 'became frightened, and scattered. It is 
about to be carried, when a new body of troops de-' 
ploying in the rear of the guns . . . . received the 
Confederates with a fie that drives them back in 
disorder ".. Gist quotes also from Whitelaw 
b id ' s  Ohio irz the War as follows: "He [Buelll 
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came into the action when, without him, all was lost. ; 
He redeemed the fortunes of the field, and justly 
. 
won the title of the 'Hero of Pittsburg Landing' 
Of! the second quotation it needs only to be said that 
' { 
its author was the newspaper correspondent who 
wrote the first sensational and untruthful account I of the Battle of Shiloh. The other quotation may 
well pass for an Arabian Nights tale. , 
rl 
General Lew. Wallace, commanding the second 
division of Grant's army, having his camp a t  
Crump's Landing six miles down the river from : 
Pittsburg Landing, has left for us his Aultobiogra- 
phg, which in many respects is an interesting work. 
But if it is to be judged by its account of the Battle 
, / ,  
'9. 
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Horneta' Nest He madib the men in the Hornetsp 
Smtawith holibg tihe prsitian "for two or three 
houm", whereas it wtw "held" from about 9 :30 a. 
m. to about 5 :30 p. m. "ap;siPst the choiwst chivalry 
of the Bouth, led by General Jobmaton himself", to 
quote k d  lhdhoe. In hat, Cbera l  Johnston 
Id no assault u p  the Hwmh' or upon any I other godtion in tihe Unim h a  Thew are a few icrf many ;B&ons in Wtc13&dig d&t~Biogqky,  where, of al l  piaces, the htih tsbmld b Popnd. 
Had it been true tlzat the pwition at the Homb' 
Hest was held "for two or. t h m  h m ' h n l ~ ~ ,  
I &s'd Buell's army then strung out over mila 
' 
of wuntry road, might d y  have suffered the same 
fate. Fortumhly, General Wallaw was writing 
G-t's canter wadd have besn bmka wMe N& 
@on's division was st i l l  tien milts away,'& a b u t  
of Shiloh, in which Wallace participated on the the hour when WaUace's division started oln ib 
second day, the author's reputation as a writer of fifteen mile march. In bhat event, ths story of the 
fiction will not suffer. General Wallace accepts , Battle of Shiloh would have been a different story. 
the W stories as to the "complete surprise" of the Chant's axmy would, probably, have been defeated, 
camp and offers argument to prove the contention. 
Then he proceeds to upset his own argument by 
showing that Prentiss and Sherman had their divi- 
sions in line of battle before six o'clock, or before 
the Confederate lines began to move to the attack. 
He brings the advance of Buell's army on the field 
some three hours before it was actually there; has 
General W. H. L. Wallace mortally wounded about 
the same length of time before the incident oc- 
curred ; has General Johnston killed in front of the 
3n. 1 ,  , " ,  ' 
At the riskr of Mousnem one more writer on thq 
Battle of Shiloh wil l  be mentioned. Qsned Buew 
who participated in the battle of the 88oond day, in 
a c a r e f a  prepared paper, entitled 8Mhh B e  
I v i e w d ~  €akm the psition of an advocafe before a 
wurt and jury* dating what he expdms to p m e ,  
- .  . 
.,# % then marshalling his facts - or fictions, as the case '"; 
I , ,  may be - to make good his conte~ltion. He opens 'd 
' + his ease with the following proposition : "At the b, 
' I  moment near the close of the day when the mmna,nt 
, L 
8 2  of the retrograding army was driven to refuge in 
n u  ! ' the midst of its magazines, with the triumphant 
' ( 1  
enemy at half-gunshot distance, the advance divi- 
sion of a reGdorcing army arrived . . . . and took 
position under fire a t  the point of attack; the at- 
tacking force was checked, and the battle ceased 
for the day." The reader, not familiar with the , 
facts, must necessarily draw two inferences from 
this statement: (1) that an entire division of 
Buell's army was "at the point of attack"; (2) that ; . . 
the presence of such a body of fresh troops decided 
the fate of the day. Both inf erenees are erroneous, 
as the facts will hw. 
On one point of some importance, Ueneral Buell 
flatly contradicts himself. In speaking of the at- 
tack nertr the Landing, Sunday night, he says, in 
ShiZoh R~euiewed, that the "fire of the gunboats was 
, 
harmless". In his official report written just after . 
the battle, he says that the "gunboats contributed 
very much to the result" - the repulse of the en- 
emy. 
Perhaps a perfectly fair and unprejudiced ac- 
count of the Battle of Bhiloh ought not to have been 
expected from the pen of General Buell. He had, 
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or fancied that he had, grievances against both Gen- 
eral. Grant and General Halleck - and he was 
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH NOT AN ISOUTED INCIDENT I 
# The Battle of Shiloh was not an isolated incident : 
it was one of a series of incidents, more or less close- 
ly related, in which the Army of the Tennessee fig- 
ured prominently and effectively, but with divided 
responsibilities. It is, therefore, proper to take 
into account conditions precedent to the battle be- 
fore passing judgment upon the men and the com- 
manders who happened to be present a t  the moment, 
and upon whom fell the immediate responsibilities, 
and who suffered for the shortcomings of others. 
The Army of the Tennessee was at  Pittsburg Land- 
ing under the orders of an officer superior in rank 
to the officer in immediate command; and it was 
there for a dehi te  purpose. If it did not accom- 
plish the definite purpose, it may be answered, in 
extenuation at  least, that it was not permitted to 
try-its hands were tied and it was ordered to 
"wait"'. It waited until compelled to fight for it9 
own safety. It saved itself from defeat and, v e q  
probably, saved from destruction another army of 
equal strength. 
It is of no consequence who h t  suggested the 
line of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers as the 
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weak point in the Confederate line between Colum- 
bus on the West and Bowling Green on the East. 
It would have been a reflection on military genius, 
if the suggestion had not come to several persons 
at  about the same b e  - so patent was the evidence. 
It & of some importance, however, to remember 
who made the first move to save the "weak point". 
Just seven months before the Battle of Shiloh (Sep- 
tember 6, 1861), the first direct step was taken 
leading to that event. 
On September 4,1861, General Grant took com- 
mand of the Cairo district with headquarters at 
Cairo, General Fremont being then department 
commander with headquarters a t  St. Louis. On the 
da.y after taking command of the district, General 
Umnt learned of an expedition from Columbus to 
occupy P a d u d  at  the mouth of the Tennessee. A 
force was a t  once prepared to anticipate the Con- 
federate movement; a dispatch was then sent to 
headquartem that the force would move a t  a certain 
hour unless orders were received to the contrary. 
No order came back, and Paducah was occupied 
without firing a shot on the next morning much to 
the surprise of the inhabitants who were hourly ex- 
pecting the Confederates then on the march. Gen- 
eral Grant returned to Cairo on the same day, find- 
ing there the order permitting him to do what was 
THE BATTLE OF SHIMlH 23 
already done. The same movement that saved the 
Tennessee saved also the Cumberland. 
Except for this prompt action on the part of Gen- 
eral Grant the mouths of these two rivers would 
surely have been strongly fortified ; but, instead, the 
Confederate line was forced back a hundred miles, 
in its center, to Fort Henry on the Tennessee and 
Fort Donelson on the Cumberland (Map I) .  
Columbus, a few miles below Cairo, strongly for- 
tified and garrisoned by the Confederates, was so 
situated that it might, unless threatened from Cairo 
and Paducah, throw troops either west into Mis- 
souri or east by rail to Bowling Green or to points 
within easy marching distance of Fort Henry and 
Fort Donelson as there might be need. A.s a result 
of these conditions, there was activity in Grant's 
district, during the fall and winter months of 1861. 
The battle of Belmont (Nov. 7,1861) was one of the 
"diversions" to keep the garrison a t  Columbus a t  
home. In the following January, General Halleck 
having become department commander, expeditions 
were sent out from Cairo and Paducah to the rear 
of Columbus and up the west bank of the Tennessee 
- General C. F. Smith commanding the latter ex- 
pedition. General Smith, having scouted as far 
toward Fort Henry as he thought advisable, went on 
board the gunboat Lexington ''to have a look" at  
the Fort. The gunboat went within "about 2y2 
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miles. . . . drawing a single shot from the enemy. . . . 
in response to four several shots fired a t  them." 
In his report (Jan. 22,1862) to Glenem1 Grant, Gten- 
era1 Smith said: "I think two iron-clad gunboa& 
would make short work of Fort Henry." " 
.On the same day that General smith reported on 
Fort Henry, General Grant was given "permission 
to visit headquarters" in response to a request made 
some time before - but he soon learned that adviee 
and suggestions in regard to affairs in his district 
were not wanted, and he went back to his cornmand. 
He ventured, however (Jan. 28th) to send the fol- 
lowing to his superior: "With permbsion, I will 
take Fort Henry . . . . and establish and hold a large 
camp there. " Yemnimion was gmnted on the 30th, 
and Grant was "off up the Tennwsee" (February 
2nd). 
Except for this appwl for "peamimion" to take 
E"ort Henrg, back& by the advice of Flag-Oflicer 
Boote, CO-n* the gunboat flotilla, the expedi- 
tion would b e  been delayed a t  least two weeks, 
giving that much more time for the Confederates to 
strengthen themselves. On the day after the sur- 
render of Fort Hemy (February 6) Ha,IIeck ble- 
graphed to Buell h t  he "had no idea of comenc- 
ing the movement before the 15th or tEze 20th in- 
stant". ' And he was evidently very uneasy about 
the success of the movement, as appears from a dis- 
! 
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patch sent to the General-in-Chief (McClellan) at  
Washington at  the very moment when Wote's guns 
were pounding a t  the little mud fort. The dispatch 
was as follows: "If you can give me . . . . 10,000 
more men, I will take Port Henry, cut the enemy's 
line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000 and 
I will threaten Nashville . . . . so as to force the 
enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a bat- 
tle. " "efore that dispatch was received in Wash- 
ington the thing was accomplished by a gunboat 
bombardment of an hour and fifteen minutes at  
Fort Henry. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the expedition 
a g a h t  Fort Henry was undertaken before Halleck 
was ready for it and the f a d  that he had misgivings 
as to its success, he yet seems to have been jealous 
lest Buell might share in the honors in case of suc- 
cess. When Buell learned of the movement, which 
was undertaken without consultation with him, he 
telegraphed Halleck to know if "co-operation" on 
his part was "essential to . . . . success," to which 
Halleck replied : " Co-operation at  present not es- 
sential"' Buell was piqued a t  Halleck's reply, 
, and telegraphed to the General-in-Chief : "I pro- 
test against such prompt proceedings, as though I 
had nothing to do but command 'Commence Gring' 
when he starts off." lo 
This episode is mentioned only for the purpose of 
d the ts~- three w%8b, after ' I 
did but oomplicate the aomp5mtiom, and upon k - ' 
e d  Grant fell the unfavorable resulter. 
No pemon was more surprised than waa G ) e d  
H;s,Uwk at the sum8a of the e x p d h n  to Fort 
Hearg., but he conthud to a p p d  to @m (;lened- 
i n - W e P  for "more hwps" while anant waa pre- 
paring to advance upn Pa& d after 
h&trnrnt!iamw 
the undoing sf % m l . U m n t  who 
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ly, arousing at  the same time the jealousy of Buell 
by bccupying Nashville just ahead of his [Buell's] 
army approaching from the North. General Grant 
was in "ahead of the hounds", a t  Nashville - that 
was his only offense. 
FROM FORT DONELSON TO SHILOH 
On the day thatnNashville was occupied by the 
Union troops (B'ebruary 25) the Confederates be- 
gan the evacuation of Columbus, the last defense on 
the original line, and began at  once to establish a 
new line along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from 
Columbus southward to Corinth and from Memphis 
eastward through Corinth to Chattanooga on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with General 
Beauregard in command, Corinth being the stra- 
tegial point at  the crossing of the two roads 
(%P 1)- 
after  the evacuation of Nashville the Confeder- 
ates under General Johnston moved southward as 
rapidly as possible, striking the Memphis and 
Charleston road at  Decatur, thence moving west to 
Corinth, the advance reaching that place March 
18th. General Johnston reached Corinth on the 
24th, assuming command of the combined Confed- 
erate f orees on the 29th. 
1 The commanders of the two Union armies, Hal- 
leck and Buell, after Nashville, did not fully agree 
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as to the best plan of following up the advantages 
already gained. Buell thought, with the General- 
in-Chief (McClellan) , that Chattanooga was of 
"next importance" after Nashville ' b n d  he pre- 
pared to follow Johnston south. Halleck thought 
that the line of the Tennessee River offered the 
opportunity to strike the enemy's center at  or near 
Corinth'bnd he urged Buell to join him in that 
movement, but without avail. A few days later, 
however, General Halleck secured what he had long 
desired, the consolidation of the two Departments 
with himself in command. Halleck urged his 
claims on two grounds: (1) that all of the armies 
of the West should be under one command, and (2) 
that the command should fall to him in recognition 
of the successful campaign against Fort Henry and 
Rod Donelson in his Department." The consolida- 
tion took place on March llth, after which date 
General Buell was subject to orders from St. Louis, 
as General (.h~nt had been from the first. General 
Buell's advance southward from Nashville had 
reached Columbia on Duck River before the con- 
solidation (March lo), but his headquarters were 
still at  Nashville. 
On the fht  of March it appears that General 
Halleck notified General Grant that his column 
would move "up the Tennessee", and that the main 
object would be "to destroy the railroad bridge over 
> 
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Bear Creek, near Eastport . . . . and also the con- 
nections at  Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. " He 
was instructed to "Avoid any general engagement 
with strong forces . . . . better. . . . retreat than to risk 
a genera1 battle." l5 Two days later, General Hal- 
leek sent to the General-in-Chief the complaint 
against General Grant, which resulted in the latter '8 
' practical suspension from active command, Halleck r 
suggesting a t  the same time that General C. F. 
: Smith command the expedition up the Tennessee. 
I n  response to Halleck's complaint, he was author- 
ized to put General Grant under arrest, ''if the good 
of the service requires it ", to which Halleck replied : 
"I do not deem it advisable to arrest him a t  pres- 
ent".'"On the fourth of March, Halleck dispatched 
to Grant: "You will place Maj. Gen. C. F. Smith 
in command of expedition and remain yourself at  
Fort Henry." To this, Grant replied, on the next 
day: "Troops will be sent, under command of 
Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared 
a different plan, intending General Smith to com- 
mand the forces which will go to Paris and Hum- 
. boldt, while I would command the expedition upon, 
Sastport, Corinth, and Jackson in person." He 
then assures General Halleck that instructions will 
be carried out "to the very best " of his ability:' 
Under this order of his superior, General Grant 
remained at  Fort Henry, acting in the capacity of 
- the most important two weeks between the date o f .  
Pittsburg Landing. The expedition was planned 
'I 
General Grant's restoration to active command of ' i 
the army in the field. 
itg from the Department commaader to select the, 
place of landing.18 General Smith established head-, . 
quarters at Savannah, on the ~ast bank of the river,, . 
but sent one division (&meal Lew. Walace) five* ' 
mile03 farther up to 4hmp's Landing on the west, 
mile of trestle work was destroyd.la The damagdL 
to the road was slight, however, as repairs were sooq 
On the 14th General Smith reported that he had , 
"not been able to get any- like ths desired intor- 
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to be quoted at  50,000 to 60,000 from Jackson 
through Corinth and farther east.'' It was this in- 
formation that induced General Smith "not to 
attempt to cut the communication at  that place, 
[Corinth] as that would inevitably lead to a colli- 
sion in numbers " that he was "ordered to avoid ' '.O 
Immediately after this report was made, General 
Sherman was ordered with his division to a point 
some distance above Pittsburg Landing, with in- 
structions to cut the Memphis and Charleston road, 
if possible, at  some point east of Corinth. The 
attempt failed on account of high water and Sher- 
man dropped back to Pittsburg Landing, where he 
met Hurlbut's division sent up by General Smith as 
support in case of need. The two divisions left the 
boats at  Pittsburg Landing and went into camp. 
General s h e d a n  sent out a strong reconnoitering 
force toward Corinth, and on the 17th he reported 
to General 8mith: "I am satisfied we cannot 
reach the Memphis and Charleston Road without a 
considerable engagement, which is prohibited by 
General Halleck's instructions, so that I will be 
governed by your orders of yesterday to occupy, 
Pittsburg strongly. ' ' 
General Lew. Wallace, whose division was at  
Crump's Landing at  this time, says in his Autobio- 
g r a p h  that if General Smith had received the or- 
der from Halleck that he expected, to move directly 
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on Corinth, "there had been no battle of Shiloh." 
And again he says that by the time General Grant 
was restored to command, the opportunity of ad- 
vancing on Corinth was "going, if not already 
gone ' '."" 
General Grant was restored to active command 
on March 17th, and going at  once to General Smith's 
headquarters at  Savannah he reported on the 18th 
the distribution of troops as he found it - three 
divisions on the west side of the Tennessee, Sher- 
man and Hurlbut at  Pittsburg Landing, and Lew. 
Wallace a t  Crump's Landing ; at Savannah, on the 
east side of the river was McCllernand's division ; 
and on transports on the river, waiting for orders, 
were several regiments which were ordered to Pitts- 
burg Landing. It is important to remember this 
distribution of the army as General Grant found it, 
under the sanction if not the direct order of the De- 
partment commander. That General Halleck still 
believed it possible to cut the Memphis and Cbarles- 
ton Railroad, according to his original plan, is 
shorn by a dispatch to General Grant (March 18th) 
based on a rumor to the effect that the enemy had 
moved from Corinth to attack the line of the Ten- 
nessee below Savannah, that is, to attack Grant's 
communications. " If so, " says General Halleck, 
"General Smith should immediately destroy rail- 
road connections at  Corinth. " ' Y o  this General 
PR 
, ,I , ,  ' " ., 1: ', ' , ' 8 ' '  
. , !  3#,# , . , , I  ' 8 * ' 1 .  ' 8  ,#', 
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Cfrant replied on the 19th: "Immediate prepara- 
tiom will be made to execute your . . . . order. I 
- wil l go in person9'.*' Again, on the next day in a 
lengthy dispatch to Halleck's Adjutant General, 
Grant repeated his intention to go "in person" with 
the expedition ' 'should no orders received hereafter 
prevent it7'- adding that he would "take no risk 
. . . . under the instructions" which he already had ; 
that if a battle seemed to be inevitable, he could 
"make a movement upon some other point of the 
railroad . . . . and thus save the demoralizing effect 
of a retreat "."" 
General Halleck evidently thought there was 
special significance in Grant's intention to "go in 
person" with the expedition toward Corinth - he 
knew something would be doing- so, on the 20th 
Halleek dispatched : "keep your forces together un- 
til you connect with General Buell . : . . Don't let 
the enemy draw you into an engagement now. " " I Before this last &patch was received, orders were issued by General Grant to all division com- 
manders to hold themselves ready to march at  a 
moment's notice, with three days' rations in haver- ' 
sacks and seven days' rations in wagons. On re- 
ceiving the "wait" order, Grant dispatched again 
(March 21) : "Corinth cannot be taken without 
meeting a large force, say 30,000. A general en- 
gagement would be inevitable ; therefore I will wait 
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a few days for further instructions." '' Evidently 
'1 
General Grant was restive and anxious, believing > 
that precious time was going to waste, as appears i 
from what he wrote to General Smith : "the sooner 
we attack the easier will be the 
As far as the records show, no orders lakr  than 
March 20th were received by General Grant ; and so 
the army within striking distance of the enemy was 
in a state of suspended animation for nearly three 
weeks. The army was expected to cut the Memphis 
and Charleston road, but it was not permitted to- 
fight for the purpose ; it must do it without disturb-, 
ing the enemy. 
It is important to remember in this conn~etiaa 
that the territory west of the Tennessee River, from 
near its mouth southward to Pittsburg Landing 
and west to the Mississippi, wm ;the enemy b coun- 
try both in sentiment and by strong military occu- 
pation, and so the expedition under Oeneral Sm#h 
up the Tennessee was moving fully two h- 
miles from its base d mpplies, wholly depend ; 
upon the river. This territory was well supplied 
with railroach under control of the enemy, by means 
of which, if mo &posed, he might throw a strong 
force on short notioe against Gteneral Smith's com- 
munieatiom. Ckmextt.1 @ant evidently had this 
danger in mind when replying to aSmral Halleck's 
order sending the expedition up the river, as already 
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March 29th : "You will concentrate all your avail- ' 
able troops at Savannah, or Pithburg, 12 miles 
above. " 
As already stated, General Buell had one division 
at Columbia - about forty miles on the road to 
Savannah - when the order came to join Grant. 
The remainder of the army moved promptly, but ' 
was detained at the crossing of Duck River in build-. 
ing a bridge until the 30th, though one division 
(Nelson's) waded the river on the 29th. 
Naturally General Grant, in front of a rapidly 
concentrating army under General Johnston and 
General Beauregard, was anxious to know of Gen- 
eral Buell's movements, and so, two days after as- 
suming active command, two couriers were started 
from Savannah for Buell's camp which was reached 
on the 23d with this.dispatch from Grant: "I am , 
massing troops at Pittsburg, Tennessee. There is 8 8  1 
every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large ij':$ 
force at Corinth* Miss., and many at other points' !I, 
on the road toward Decatur. " Thus General Buell 
had positive knowledge both from anera1 Halleck 
and General &ant that the latter was "massing 
troops" at Pittsburg Landing - and this informa- 
tion was in possession of General Buell a full week 
before his army was able to cross Duck River (about 
90 miles away) and two weeks before the battle. 
This point is dwelt upon for the reason that cer- 
:,I , " , '  ' ' ' 8 '  8 ,  , !yv) '  :I ' 
1 ' Iu , 8 I 
tain writem have erroneody chimed that Gteneml 
Ruell had not been informed of General Grant's 
position on the west bank of the Ternwee and 
hence did not prem hirr masah, 
After wading Du& Rivw a ~ ,  Gteneral Nel- 
son's divbio11 went into mmp ~ Q E  hhe night, and 
took up the maroh next ma*, (the SOth) reach- 
ing Elavnnnah about mooo, A@ 5th, hving 
mmxhed an average 
eral Buell arrived 
on the same day, but 
Grsnt, when the latter, with hiex B ~ E ~  h k  bat next 
morning for the battle field &%ex sin "early b- 
f a t w  left unhbhed. 
It need not be matter of s q r b e  fib1 Chw3ral 
Budl should be reluctant to join his army- of &bu t  
equal strength and independent h c o m n d  with 
fie army on the Tennwsee. It was Buell's to 
~~ the Tennessee h i g h  up and conduct a am- 
pip of his own. With this in mind he E~UQ- 
to General Haeek that he [Buell] be permitted 4x1 
halt and go oamp about th i r ty .dq~  east of 
Havannsh, at Waynabom. To this suggedion €+en-* 
eral Halleck replied on the 5th: "You are right 
about concentrating at Waynwbmugh l?uf;ure 
movements must depend upan tho88 of memy. "" 
General Buell iesued orders to L ' c o n ~ h b ' ' *  but 
- 
-l',J 
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fortunately his advance had passed the point desig- 
nated before the orders were delivered, and the 
march continued. Had it been otherwise the r&n- 
forcihg army would have been forty milm away, 
instead of its advance division being within ten 
miles, when the battle began. , , -  8 g" k , , ~  
It may be asked: Why did not General Buell 
make his presence in Savannah known to General 
Grant promptly on arrival O Pwbaps a perfectly 
just answer cannot be given in view of the fact that 
the former was not required to "report" to the 
latter as a subordinate to a superior - the one was 
to join the other and wait for orders from a higher 
source than either. There was but one e o n ~ g ~ c y  
under which any part of GeneraIBuell's army could 
come under General Grant's odem a n  attack 
u p  the htter. General HaiIIeck's instructions to 
General Grmt were (Apil5tjh) : "You will act in 
cone&, but he [Buell,] will exercise his separate 
mmmasd, llnlms the memy should attack you. I n  
that case you are authorized to take the general 
command, kF'e The contingency arose on the morn- 
ing of the 6th. 
BEFORE THE BATTLE 
Prom the date of General Halleck's "wait" or- 
der to the date of the battle - that is from March 
20th to April 6th - there were fifteen full days, dur- 
; r . 8 -, , . , 8 
,p;'#; ' 
CI 
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ing which time this positive order was in force: 
"My instructions not to advance must be obeyed. ' ' 
I Nothing, therefore, remained but to watch the en- 
I emy and dodge him in case he offered battle in any 
I considerable force. There was scarcely a day in 
I that waiting time in which there was not recon- 
noitering, resulting in several light encounters. 
Colonel Buckland, commanding the fourth brigade 
of General Sherman's division, has given a good ac- 
count of the condition of things at  the front during 
I the three or four days before the battle in a paper 
I 
I read before the Societg of the Army of the Tennes- 
I see in 1881 and published in the Proceedings of the 
I Society."' 
On Thursday, April 3d, three days before the 
battle and the day on which the Confederates 
marched from Corinth and surrounding camps, 
Colonel Buckland under orders of the division com- 
mander reconnoitered four or five miles toward 
Corinth, finding the enemy in such force as to deter 
him from attack, in view of the order to "fall back" 
rather than risk bringing on a general engagement. 
The brigade marched back without an encounter., 
On the next day the picket line was attacked in front 
of Buckland's brigade, and a picket post was cap- 
tured, consisting of a Lieutenant and seven men. 
Colonel Buckland went out with a regiment to inves- 
tigate and had two of his companies surrounded by 
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Confederate cavalry, which was in turn surprised 
and routed by the reenforcements sent to the relief 
of the two companies. Just as the enemy appeared 
to be forming for a counter attack on Buckland, the 
Fifth Ohio cavalry of Sherman's division came up, 
attacked and routed the enemy, capturing several 
prisoners. Tbis affair developed the presence of 
the enemy in considerable force - infantry, caval- 
ry, and artillery. When Colonel Buckland reached 
the picket line, on his return to camp, he found 
General Sherman with several regiments awaiting 
him and wanting to know, with a show of displeas- 
ure, what he had been doing out in front. after 
hearing Colonel Buckland's account of the matter, 
he was ordered back to camp with big men, General 
Sherman accompanying the order with the remark 
that he might have brought on a general engage- 
ment, which is to be understood as a mild reprimand. 
So particular was Gteneral Sherman to avoid cen- 
sure that he required Colonel Buckland to make a 
written report of the incident which report was sent 
to &nerd Grant. 
Colonel Buckland further says that he was along 
the picket line several times on Saturday, the day 
before the battle, and saw the enemy a t  several 
points, and that the pickets reported activity near 
the lines. Other officers made similar observations. 
"It was the belief of all", says Colonel Buckland, 
- - 
"that the enemy intended to attack ua, either dur- 
ing the night or early in the This feel- 
ing was so strong that regimental officers were in- 
structed to have their commands in readiness for 
attack - the' picket line was strengthened and a 
line of sentries was established from the picket line 
back to camp. 
Similar evidence as to the activity of the enemy 
on Saturday the 5th is furnished by Captain I. P. 
Rumsey, a staff officer of General W. H. L. Wallace, 
who was riding outside the lines on that day. On 
relmmhg to camp Captain Rumsey reported to Col- 
onel Dickey, 4th Illinois cavalry, that he had seen a 
considerable body of Confederate cavalry. The 
two officers going to General Sherman's headquar- 
ters, reported the facts, to which General Sherman 
replied : "I know they are out there, but our b n d s  
are tied; we can't do a thing." Colonel Dickey then 
asked permission to take his regiment out to investi- 
gate, receiving for reply : "Dickey, if you were to 
go out there with your regiment you would bring 
on a battle in less than an hour, and we have positive 
orders not to be drawn into a battle until Buell: 
comes. " 
Colonel McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer, 
who was camping with the second division (W. H. 
L. Wallace) fully corroborates the above state- 
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men@ by saying: "It was well known the enemy the morning and that he would not survive the battle, 
was approaching our lines";'" decided to take upon himself the responsibility of 
8 A) Apprehension of an early attack upon the a m p  sending out a party to reconnoiter. So Major Pow- 
prevailed among the subordinate officers of Gteneral ell, an officer of the Regular Army and Field Officer :' 
Prentiss's division, as wen as among those of h n -  of the Day was ordered to take three companies of 
eral Sherman's division, and similar orders were the 25th Missouri, start a t  about 3 o'clock in the 
given to companies and regiments to be prepared for morning, and march until he found the enemy. The 
a night or an early morning attack. And it seems companies constituting the party were B, H, and E, 
now to be well settled that the reconnoitering party of the 25th Missouri. How and where the enemy 
sent out from Prentiss's division before daylight on was found will be related farther on. 
Sunday morning was sent out by Colonel Peabody Some persons will have doubts, probably, in re- 
of4he 25th lkfissouri, o-&g t'b fisst brigade gard to the story of Colonel Peabody's premonitions 
of the division, and wiiihou4 ths kao+&e of Gten- of attack, and death in battle, but there can be no 
era1 Prentisls. doubt about the attack, or about the death of Colonel 
In the history of the 25th .AEitiwoa edikd and Peabody, within a few minutes after the main bat- 
compiled by Dr. Wd 4.. Nml, &&hat Surgeon of tle began. Major Powell was also killed early in 
W r ~ g b e n t ,  ~ a y g C Z  pyW&ed in m9# appears a de- the battle, and so the two principal actors in the first 
bi3.d a w &  of ,&e a~@m ~f Colonel Peabody on scene of the drama passed quickly off the stage, 
k ~ T B  of b ~ h S  as r8hhd by Lieutenant James but not until after the chief of the two was severely 
Bd; Newhrtrd, ah tka me Orderly S e r g w t  of Com- reprimanded, at  the head of his brigade in line and 
p a y  E, 25th lkG.t4a9d9 om of the companies in the waiting for orders. The following letter, to a 
rwosu10itSn5ng pa,*. It is related that Colonel nephew of Colonel Peabody, here given by permis- 
Peabody urged upon Ghmeral P m n W  on Satamday sion, tells the story. 
the 5th &at an 'was very p~obakde and t;ba;t 333 Highland Av. 
preparation be made acco-gly. ith. F. E. F'EABODY, SOMER~LUC, Mass. Feby. 27th 1902 
nothing was done s m p t  to strengthm pi&& and BOX 7 ~oston. 
guards Colonel Sabdy ,  under the haflueno8 of a 
premonition that an attack would be made early in Referring to our convemtion concerning the Battle of Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, April 6 & 7, 1862, I have to 
4' 
state h t :  Everett Pabody, Cdonel of the 26th Mo. Vol. 
Inft., was in command of the h t  B~igade 6th Division and I I 
was senior Captain of the regiment. 
' I  
At early morn before breakfast the line of Wattle was 
formed, with the right of Brigade resting on the right of our 
, 
regimental color line. My company was on the right of Bri- 
gade. A few minutes after the line was formed, General Pren- 
m 
tisa rode up near Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in 
, 
front of my ompasy, about the center of the firat platoon 
and said to him, "Colonel Peabody, I hold you responeible for 
bringing on this fight. " Saluting, Colonel Peabody said : "If 
I brought on the fight I am able to lead the van." General 
Pmtiss ordered him, to take his best merit . . . . the next ' 
words I heard were : " 25th Missouri, forward. " 
. Signed Yours respectfully, 
% T F. C. NIOHOL~, 
Captain U. S. Army, Retired; 
formerly Major & Capt. 25th Mo. 
Vol. Inf. War of '61 & 5. 
This letter by Capt. Nichols makes elear and pos- 
itive two important points : (1) that General Pren- 
tiss, like General Sherman, was impressed with the 
idea that, under General Halleck's orders the en- 
emy was to be avoided rather than sought out, and 
he reprimanded his brigade commander for doing, 
irregularly, the very thing that saved the army 
from the "surprise" about which so many un- 
truths have been told; (2) the letter makes it clear 
that Prentiss's division was neither in bed nor at  
breakfast, when the attack came - it was in line 
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I "before breakfmt", a d  the enemy was received 
with a hot f ie,  as wiU appear. 
Prenths 's reprimand of Colonel Peabody was, 
doubtlem, prompted by the -me m e  of xe~ponsi- 
bsty  as wars that atbmmb . . mi by General Elher- 
man Oo. Golgael BueUnd, already mentioned. It 
had been "ground info'"& CpIdiPision commander, 
SO to speak, that, "in no casa" w m  t h y  "to be 
drawn into an engagem~at." 
There was another incident in the a&ivities im- 
mediately preceding the battle, mure Ilmportdtnt 
than anything yet mentioned, wMCa, however, was 
not revealed, until forty years b b x  -- an incident 
which, had it been known when and by whom it 
should have been known, the BaLttle of Shiloh would 
have had a different story to tell. We now how,  
though the knowledge is comparatively recent but 
entirely reliable, that General Lew. Wallace, corn- 
manding the second division of the army at  Grump's 
Landing, had podtive information of the movement 
of the Omfederate army to attack Grant on the very 
day that the movement began - infom%ion 
I brought directly to him by one h t e d  smut and 
confirmed by a second. During two full days m d  
three nighb ("for three days and nights,'% quota 
his language) he "simmers" fhis all-important in- 
formation in his mind, trying to d e b d e  how he 
46 THE-BA~TLE OF "SHILOH 
could best reenforce the comrades beyond Snake ' 'S  
Creek in case of need. 
ment of the Confederate army from Corinth as 
follows : 
Bell the scout came into my tent, evidently the worse ' 
for a hard ride, and said, abruptly, 'I bring you 
news, sir. . . . The whole rebel army is on the way up 
, 
from Corinth. . . . They set out this morning early. 
By this time they are all on the road . . . . batteries ,. ' 
and all.' This important information was c o e -  ,- 
ed by another scout (Carpenter) : 'Johnston's cut 
loose and is making for Pittsburg. ' ' ' " 
General Wallace says that he sent this informa- ' 
tion by his orderly, on the same evening to Pitts- r )  
burg Landing, with htructions in case Grant was 
not found to leave the dispatch with the postmas- 8: 
ter, to be delivered next morning. General Wal- ' 
lace's excuse for not sending a proper officer with ' , 
positive orders to fmd Grant, seems almost too 
puerile to be crdt;ed - he did not want to appear ' 
"officious". The dispatch never reached its proper 
destination, and the secret was in the keeping of 1, 
General Wallace mtil he disclosed it in his Azctobio- , 
have died with him. A dispatch boat was at  all , ' 
u -  I, . . ,  1.1 F , ' 1  11.' ,;') ,TI- - ; ' f q n i  -;; 
. , I 1 ' .  . 
1 I , ,  
I I, ' , 
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times at  Wallace's,headquarters, subject to his or- 
ders, and there should have been no diillculty in the 
way of .finding General Grant within two hours, 
whether at the Landing above or at Savannah below. 
It is worth remembering in this connection that the 
orderly sent with this dispatch went by the river 
road and over 8nake Creek bridge which had been 
repaired on that very day under direction of Colonel 
McPherson, Halleck's chief engineer. General 
Wallace pleaded ignorance of this road, twd days 
later, in excusing himself for marching his division 
over the wrong road. Y. YF J 
THE UNION ARMY BND THE FIELD 
To understand and properly appreciate the d3E- 
culties under which the Battle of Shiloh was fought 
on the Union side, the composition of the Army and 
the topography of the field must both be considered. 
The Army of the Tennessee as it was camped in the 
woods above Pittsburg Landing on Elmday morn- 
ing, April 6,1862, was never in a camp of organiza- 
tion and instruction, as an Army - it grew by accre- 
tion, beginning at  Fort Donelson in the middle of 
February preceding. Some of the regiments that 
stormed the enemy's works at  Donelson dropped 
into line for the &-st time under fire, and only a few 
. hours before the assault was made. I n  like manner 
new and untrained regimenh and batteries came, 
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me by one, to swell the rtbalrsJ at ghiloh, even after 
tihe roar of h t t i e  sounded through the woods, tak- 1 
bag their k p e d  p k  under fie. The division .' 
(Pmmth'~~ 6th). from which the reconnoitering 
party went out before daylight on Sunday morning 
to "~surprise" the enemy was the newest of the new, 
having but two organiaed brigades - though there 
was enough "raw material'' amcsd to the divi- 
sion for a third brigade, llst all au &e ground, how- 
ever, w b n  the battle begag, 1$,fdmW is d e d  to 
these fa& for thca mason t k k  &r &auld he Wen 
into amount in p a k q  j upon $he B a t e  
of Shiloh. 
Bwides the la& of and drill of the 
a the g & ~ u ~ d @  A written descrip- , 
y onlg a vmy w e d  idea of thdl. 
whicb W &Me ww fought; hence a 
the em$ 'mmounded 
kPrim on dz $ddim -- exoept 
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miles in width. The plateau sheds its waters west, 
north, and east-west and northwest into Owl 
Creek; north into Snake Creek; and east into the 
Tennessee. The creeks were effectually guarded 
by swampy margins and heavy timber, or by a com- 
.% * 
bination of the three - timber, under-brush, and ; 
swamp. They admitted of no crossing except by 
bridges, of which there was one on each of the 
stream leading to and from the battle field. The 
Tennessee could be crossed only by boat, as the army 
had never been supplied with pontoons. 
This plateau, bordered as described, ww cut into 
numerous gullies and ravines by small spring- 
branches, running to all points of the compass in 
finding their tortuous ways to .the larger streams. 
Most of these spring-branches ran through marshy 
ground - impaasable in the early spring except 
where bridged. Some of the ravines were deep, 
miry, and so densely choked with briers and bram- 
bles as to defy invasion by anything much larger 
than a rabbit. The hillsides and the ridges were 
covered with timber and underbrush, except where 
small farms were under cultivation. There was not 
an elevation a n ~ h e r e  on the three miles square 
from which a general view could be had. Wide 
.flanking movements were impossible to either army, 
and cavalry was practically useless. The Landing 
itself was a mud bank at  the foot of a steep bluff, a 
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-10 road winding -aroumd the bluff and up the 
Mbide to higher p o d  At a distance of about a 
half-mile from the Landing the road forked and a 
little further on struck the Hamburg and Savannah 
rod, running marly parallel with the river. Still , 
further on the Corinth road c& the Hamburg 
and Pusdy xuad and struck the Bark road, one 
branch three miles out and the other branch four 
miles out* aesides th main 
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Hamburg and Savannah road and the river was 
much broken - so much so that there were but two 
or three cultivated fields on that part of the plateau. 
THE CQNFEDERBTE ARMY BND ITS OBJECTIVE 
As already stated, after the surrender of Fort 
Donelson and the evacuation of Nashville General 
Johnston's army fell back as rapidly as possible 
southward to the line of the Memphis and Charles- 
ton Railroad with a view to joining General Beaure- 
gard, who commanded the territory west of the 
Tennessee River with headquarters at  Corinth. By 
the last week in March there had been concentrated 
a t  Corinth and in the vicinity an army of 40,000 
effective men, and General Johnston took command 
on the 29th of March with General Beauregard sec- 
ond in command. The object to be accomplished by 
this army was to attack and defeat Grant's army be- 
fore the arrival of Buell, then on the march from 
Nashville with 37,000 men, following up this antici- 
pated success with the defeat of Buell, thus opening 
the way back to Nashville so recently evacuated. The 
movement from Corinth and surrounding camps to 
attack Grant began in the early morning of April 
3d, with a view to making the attack early on the 
5th. Bad weather and bad roads delayed the attack 
twenty-four hours - to Sunday morning, April 6th. 
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How the expected "surprise" of Grant's army was , 
anticipated will now be told. 
THE BATTLE 
It is not the purpose to describe in detail the move- 
ments of the battle throughout the two days, but 
only to touch upon salient features. One of the 
salient features, and not the least important, is that 
of the action of the reconnoitering party heretofore 
referred to as having been sent out before daylight 
on Sunday morning from Prenti8s7s division. Gen- 
eral Prentiss in his official report makes no men- 
tion of the Powell party, but he says that "at 3 
o'clock . . . . Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Mis- 
souri, with five companies of his infantry regiment? 
proceeded to the front, and at  break of day the ad- 
vance pickets were driven in"." 
Colonel Moore, in his official report, says that he 
was ordered out by Colonel Peabody, commanding 
the First Brigade, "at about 6 o'cl~ck"~ to support, 
the picket guard which "had been attacked and: 
driven in". It appears to be certain, therefore, 
that both the reconnoitering party under Major ' 
Powell and the support under Colonel Moore were " 
ordered out by Colonel Peabody without consulting , 
the division commander ; hence the reprimand above 
quoted -heard and remembered by many others '. 
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besides Captain Nichols. Colonel Moore's command 
was a reenforcing not a reconnoitering party. 
The line of march of the Powell party may be 
traced on the map (No. 11) along the road passing 
the camp of the 25th Missouri, past the southeast 
corner of Rhea Field and the north side of Seay 
Field, passing the picket line at  the forks of the road 
and striking the corner of Praley Field a few rods 
farther on. From this point the videttes of the Con- 
federate picket, under Major Hardcastle of Har- 
dee's corps were encountered. The videttes fired 
upon the advancing party and retired to the picket 
line at  the southwest corner of Fraley Field. The 
firing at  first was at  random. As there never was 
an official report made of the part taken by the 
Powell reconnoitering party, as both the officer 
ordering it out and the officer commanding it were 
killed early in the main battle, we must rely upon 
the report of the officer commanding the Confeder- 
ate picket at  Fraley Field for the incidents of that 
encounter. Major Hardcastle says the firing began' 
"about dawn" (at 455  in fact), and he says: "We 
fought the enemy an hour or more without giving 
an inch". "At about 6:30" he saw the brigade 
formed behind him and "fell back". The casual- 
fight between the picket post and Powell's party 
began at  once, though it was still quite dark - "too 
dark to see, in the timber and underbrush", so the 
th~ in Major Eardcttstle'a command were four 
kjlld and nineteen wounded." The muotlfies in 
tb Powell party were never cer$&dy known 
!PI& ~iabborn picket fight seems to have been 
something of a " s u p p ~ "  to a t  least one of the 
Confederate gem& General Bragg, command- 
ing the second line of attack, says in his official re  
port that "the enemy did not give us time to discum 
the question of attack, for man afbr dawn he am-  
menced a rapid musketry &,@ on our pickets."" 
Major Hardwtle, 
says: "Theenemy 
distance of about two 
O s e e  when the fhkg be- 
l i imhst le  's official a p ~ &  
rd. The battle~&ont,, two and pl, half 
wit& a e-in of id&mi&- 
Majar Powellss party 
d d  and waunaed they 
The force now 00- of the 21st Missouri, three 
cmpanies of the 25th f i m e  four companies of 
the 16th W i s o o ~  and two companies of the 12th 
Michigan-'all Mantry. !Phis force formed in 
Seay M d  and advmoedl to a pkt near b e  north- 
we& corner of the dad, where tihe Confederate 
skbmbhem were 8neombdf tihe 8th and 9th AP- 
kamas ( a  ) 9ke rt dmrp fight at  
this point lasting ~Bsafr tbbty mhm4~~1, ia which 
Colonel Moore ww m v d y  mundd. Luieutmmt 
Mam of the same ragheat ma womded, and Cap- 
tain Saxe (16th Wh&) WM PcSaFBd - the &st 
Union officer killed in the Battle of BMoh. 
aS the Confederates a d v m d ,  liktl0 Union 
force moved slowly back semm SMoh Bran&, 
forming again a t  a point about t;wo hmdrsa y a r h  
from the southeast corner of Rhea Field, where 
the remainder of Peabody's brigade was in line, 
This position was held from a half hour to an hoztr 
againeht h o  brigades (8haver's and Wood's), 
While falling back in line'ham this point Major 
, King (2lst Missouri) was mortally wounded. 
Meantime, General Prentiss had formed th& re- 
mainder of his division (Miller's brigade) m d  had' 
&lvanced about eighty r& from the f~mt  of hies 
camp to the muth ~ i d e  of Spain Fidd '(Map m), 
, . where he wm joined by Peabody% brigade, Pawell's 
party, and the pickets. The dipision, now comist- 
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h g  of seven regiments and two batteries, was here 
a h ~ k e d  by four brigades - Wood, Shaver, Glad- 
den, and Ohahem - comprising twenty regiments 
and three batteries. Against this tremendous odds 
the position was held for about thirty minutes, when 
the division fell back to the line of the eamp where 
another stand of about thirty minutes was made, the 
division k 1 1 y  retiring at about nine o'clock- 
more than five horn after the r e~moib r ing  party 
marched out. b o n g  the casua~.Ma on the Union 
side in front of Prentissys W o n  were Colonel 
Peabody and Major Powell, k&edu; and on the 
Confederate side General GIreadm wm mortally 
wounded. 
Them is ample ~ m p  in uftlckl repokta 
of Cosfd-b to b w  bt the msishnce 
met by the mew,-& in the slow advan9 
nQ?M of .the f € & % k e ~  of aaC 
q@rp znanp ca19ualties on bodrn 
of Unbn men on their 
. Indeed there was 
newspaper c o ~ p o n d -  
enb. i s l s d i t i a ~ ~ h b ~ t e d t J m t ~ ~ ~ e f i i m e  
when the lines b mllisionat the f ~ &  - about 
8 o 'clmk - every regbefit in the amp, tibm mil- 
in extent, was in line waiting orders or was march- 
ing toward the sound of battle. 
A word' of. explanation should her; be made in 
regard to General Sherman's (5th) division. This 
division was the first to go into camp at Pittsburg 
Landing, and the necessities of the situation re- 
quired it to cover three important approaches from 
the back country to the Landing; namely, the main 
Corinth road ; a bridge on the Hamburg and Purdy 
road over Owl Creek; and a ford over Lick Creek 
near its mouth which accommodated travel from 
Hamburg both to Purdy and Savannah. The cross- 
ing of Owl Creek was about three miles west of the 
w Landing, and the crossing of Lick Creek was about 
the same distance to the south of the Landing ; while 
the Corinth road ran southwest nearly midway be- 
tween the two crossings. General Sherman camped 
three brigades (lst, 3d, and 4th) to occupy the Cor- 
inth road at Shiloh meeting-house, thus covering 
Owl Creek bridge. The other brigade (Stuart's) 
camping to cover Lick Creek crossing, was separat- 
' 
ed from the division by a little mpre than one mile, 
and it remained separated throughout the first day's 
battle, acting independently of the orders of the divi- 
1 sion commander. The space between the two parts 
of @hemn's  division was later occupied by Gen- 
era1 Prentiss's (6th) division formed of new regi- 
i ments as they arrived. When reference is here- 
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after made to Sherman's division, in the action of 
Sunday, it is to be undemtood that Stuart's brigade 
is not included for the reasons explained. 
. 
Still another explanation ia needed. When &n- 
era1 Sherman first went into camp special attention 
was paid to the selection of camping sites conven- 
ient to good water. By consulting the map it wil l  
be seen that three brigades of this division were 
camped somewhat irregularly, the left brigade be- 
ing out of line with the other brigades and also out 
of line in itself. As a consequence when line of 
battle was formed on Sunday morning it was not a 
prolonged line, the left of Hildebrandk brigade 
being well forward and in an open field where it 
was peculiarly exposed to the force of the &st onset 
to which it quickly yielded as wil l  be seen. 
1 At a little after aeven o'dock, and after line of 
M e  had been formed, Geneml Sherman and staff ' 
rode to the left of his divbion in Rhea Pield for a 
better view to the front; and while there in front 
of the 53d Ohio reghent (001. Appler) the Confed- 
emte s m e m  opened fire from the brush across 
Shiloh Bmnoh7 kiEling the general's orderly. At 
about eight o'c1oek, looking off to the "left front", 
there were seen "the glistening bayonets of masses 
, 
of infantry", and then, for the &st time, General 
Sherman was convinced that &'the enemy designed 
a determined A few minutes later the , 
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Confederate advance struck Sherman's left under 
Colonel Hildebrand, and Prentiss's right under Col- 
onel Peabody. How Prentiss b division met the at- 
tack has already been stated. How Sherman's divi- 
sion met it will now be shown. 
The 53d Ohio, exposed as has been explained, and 
commanded, unfortunately, by an officer whose 
nerve deserted him a t  the critical moment, after 
firing two volleys, became demoralked and as an 
organization disappeared, though two companies 
were rallied by their officers, joined other organiza- 
tions and staid on the firing line throughout the 
day. Colonel Appler disappeared from the field 
and was later cashiered for cowardice. 
The attack on Sherman's left and center by Cle- 
burne's brigade of Hardee's corps was furious and 
sustained - to be repulsed, however, with heavy 
loss, by Buckland's brigade and the two remaining 
regiments of Hildebrand's brigade. Cleburne, in 
his official report of this affair, says : "Everywhere 
his musketry and artillery at  short range swept the 
open spaces . . . . with an iron storm that threatened 
certain destruction to every living thing that would , 
dare to cross them. . . . . Under the terrible fire much 
confusion followed, and a quick and bloody repulse 
was the consequence. " '" 
One of Uleburne's regiments (6th Miss.) lost 
three hundred men, killed and wounded, out of 425, 
- .  
sell 's and Johnson's) joined with the reorganized 
brigades of Cleburne and Anderson and assist- 
ed by Wood on their right. This assault was sue- 
cessfa forcing Sherman from his first line a t  
about ten o'clock, and with him one brigade of 
McClernand's division that had come to his support 
on the left. Sherman's right brigade (McDowell's) 
was not involved in this engagement for the reason 
that the line of attack crowed its front diagonally 
without bringing it into action; but a little later 
Pond's brigade, from the extreme left of Bragg's 
corps, app~&md iaMcDowelI's front, overhpping 
hh right and covering Owl Creek bridge. Orders 
were then given to fall back to the Purdy road, 
\ :, .# a d  McDowel19s amp was abandoned without a 
I 
. ' " 4 fight* By this time Ilildebrand'~ brigade had gone 
, , to pie- and HiHebmnd himself being without a 
coimmnd, mpted to General McClernand for 
staff duty. In fa& this first assault on Shermanb 
line fell mainly upon a single brigade (Buck- 
land's), and it m s  on the hillside in his front 
where, according to General Lew. Wallace, there 
was "a pavement of dead men", after the fight was 
over. This must be considered one of the conspicu- 
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a ~ ~ d  his brigade soon went to pieces. A second (as- , ow features of Sunday's battle. Time was of the 
sault was made by Anderson's brigade of Bragg's utmost importance, to enable the proper formations 
corps to meet a similar repulse. A third m u l t  ,, in distant parts of the camp. The needed tm,e was 
was made by two brigades of Polk's corps (Rw- secured by the stubborn fight made by Sherman's 
division on its first line; and it was probably this 
that gained for General Sherman, in the minds of 
some, credit for saving the day. 
It was in the Confederate plan to push its right 
east to the river, turn the Union left, seize the Land- 
ing, and force the army back on Owl Creek where 
it was expected surrender would necessarily follow. 
The stubbornness of the resistance to the Confeder- 
ate left delayed the movement toward the river 
somewhat, though two brigades (Chalmers's and 
Jackson's) were in front of the Union left near the . 
mouth of Lick Creek, very soon after the extreme 
right fell back from the first line. To meet these 
two brigades of nine regiments and two batteries, 
Colonel Stuart had a single brigade of three regi- 
ments without artillery- and one of these regi- 
ments (71st Ohio) was led off the field by its 
colonel soon after the fight began, to take no further 
part in the day's battle. Colonel Mason was later, 
cashiered for his conduct at  Shiloh. 
The two remaining regiments of this brigade 
gave a good account of themselves (55th Illinois 
and 54th Ohio), making heroic resistance and suf- 
fering severely in casualties. There are those who 
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> 
M e v e  that the fighting on the extreme left by W 
little band of about eight h m h d  men without 
aMery and against M e  or four times their nun- 
ber with artillery was not less impartant .than .was 
the fighting on the extreme right, though less ooa- 
spicuous. This movement of the Confederate 
I right vrw under ' the personal &ection of General 
Johnston, and upon ita quick sumem depended the 
SUOC& of the battle as pkmed. Before elevep 
oklock the battle was pa right to left, a 
distance of three to fowf 
As has been already stated.' dv tihe b e  that the 
Morn-d pmmptly kxppoArik$ $herman, and , 
Hurlbut alao sent oqe'at hie bz&m%m (Veatch9s) to i 
h* !p &Pision falling back in disorder, alloaed 1 
a d  '8 brigad; south, w h m  he 
P d o n d  camp, \c hhr this positida mser,aiAaeked 
by the b&pdm d! Bowen, LJtatbm, &@hem, and 
Gladden - W htter officer. however: havine re- I 
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I ceived a mortal wound in front of Prentiss's first line, as already stated. 
C. P. Srhith's (2nd) division, now commanded by 
W. H. L. Wallace, camped near the Landing, and 
fully three miles from the point where the battle 
I began, was in line by eight o'clock, and the first brigade of four regiments (Colonel Tuttle) ad- 
vanced to Duncan Pield and took position in the 
"sunken road7'-- long abandoned as useless, but 
which ere nightfall was destined to become famous 
for desperate fighting against odds (Map 111). 
Of the second brigade (General McArthur 's) one 
regiment was sent to the right; two were sent to 
cover Snake Creek bridge, over which General 
Lew. Wallace's division was expected a t  an early 
hour; and two marched under General McArthur 
himself, to the support of Stuart, on the extreme 
left. The third brigade (Sweeny's) moved south 
on the Corinth road to act as a reserve, though it 
was not permitted to wait upon opportunity. Two 
regiments of this brigade (7th and 58th Illinois) 
were sent a t  once to the right to prolong Tuttle's 
line to connect with MeClemand, going into posi- 
tion a t  about nine-thirty o'clock. A third regiment 
(50th Illinois) was sent to McArthur on the left; 
and the remaining regiment of the brigade (8th 
Iowa), between eleven and twelve o 'clock, took posi- 
tion at  Tuttle's left in the "sunken road" comect- 
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twelve o'clock, in front of Hurlbut and near where 
General Johnston had his headquarters in the sad- 
dle. Though General Johnston personally directed 
mmi, jwt landed from the boa& giving him about the battle on the Confederate side, in this part of the 
a3he thoasand men in the 4 4 H o ~ e t s '  Nest". !Two field, he did not, as some writers have told the story, 
other regbnmts (15th rtnd 16th h), awigmd b personally encourage an unwilling Tennessee reg& 
Prmtiss?e divhioq landing too late to join him at* ment by riding along the line and tapping the bay- 
his camp, were sent to M c C l e m &  joining him at onets of the men with a tin cup which he carried in 
Joasa'g gield, one and a W' dai west of the his hand, then leading the line in a furious charge. 
Landing. ' No part of such an incident occurred there or else- 
Before noon the contending &a WWB in am- where, on the authority of one of General John- 
lhuous and compact b e  fma %ton's chief Aids, Governor Harris of Tennessee - 
the only person who was present a t  the death of 
. General Johnston soon after, and near the spot 
where the incident is said to have occurred. 
Stuart, McA.rthur, and Hurlbut having success- 
fully repulsed several attacks, General Johnston 
was evidently convinced that the Union left was not 
to be easily turned; and so about noon under his 
personal direction, having put into his lines two 
brigades of the reserve under General Brecken- 
ridge, a forward movement was ordered, six bri- 
gades participating - Chalmers 's, Jackson's, Bow; 
en's, Statham's, Stephens's, and Gladden's. Threat- 
ened on his left by a cavalry flanking movement, 
Stuart was the fkst slowly to give ground; Mc- 
Arthur, on Stuart's right, necessarily followed, 
both changing front from south to southeast, falling 
' " ~ " ' " " U  ' "" " THE QB ' L . 8  I- 
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back and fighting for every foot of ground. This 4 
movement compelled .Hurlbut to retire from Bis 
first position to the north side of the Peach Or- 
chard (Map IY). At about two o'cloclock, Colonel ; '  
Stuart been wounded, his two regiments 
having lo& heavily, and having exhausted their 
- 
ammunition - even after robbing the cartridge- ; " 
boxes of their dead and wounded comrades - re- , :' 
tired toward the Landing. General McArthur , # ,  
followed not long after ; and General Hurlbut, h v -  
ing connected his right with General Prentiss's ' 
left, swung back until their lines were nearly at 
right angles (Map V). Hurlbut =tired toward . : 
the Landing a t  about four or four-thirty o'clock, ' 
leaving the line from left to right in the following 
order: Prentiss's command, 8th Iowa of Ebweeny's ,, 
brigade? Tuttle9s fall brigade, and ,#he 58fh IUinok ' ' 
of Bweeny's brigade. 
. Wbile this fierce tgtruggle was in progress on the 
Confderah right, a t  about two-thirty afternoon, 
G e m 4  Johnsbn received the wound from which 
he died a few minu'tes later. General Brag 
took oomrmnd of the right, and General R 
succeeded Bragg in the center. 
While the battle raged on the Union left, as des- , 
cribed, it wm not less stubborn and bloody on the 
right ; but l3hennan and McClemnd were forced . 
back to the Hamburg and Savannah road - a mile 
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from the Landing-about four-thirty o'clock, the 
Confederates gradually closing in from both flanks 
around the center (Map VI). Meantime General 
W. H. L. Wallace had sent orders for his command 
to retire; but for some reason never e=#&ed four 
of his six regiments did not receive tfi, order and 
were captured, as will be explained. '& ~ e n e r a l  
Wallace and General Tuttle, followed by the 2nd 
and 7th Iowa Regiments, were fighting their way 
through a severe crossfire a t  short range, General 
Wallace was mortally wounded, and was left on the 
field to be recovered the next day, dying three or 
four days later without recovering consciousness. 
This appellation owes its origin to the men who 
felt the sting of the hornets. William Preston 
Johnston in his history of his father (General A. S. 
Johnston) speaks of the term as a "mild met- 
aphor", and says that "no figure of speech would be 
too strong to express the deadly peril of an assault 
upon this natural fortress whose inaccessible bar- 
riers &zed for six hours with sheets of flame, and 
whose infernal gates poured forth a murderous 
storm of shot and shell and musket-fire which 
living thing could quell or withstand"?' 
No more graphic description of the fight a t  the 
Hornets' Nest has been written than that of which 
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into the fight again . . . . during the day."" #en- 
eral Ruggles, who commanded the Confederate 
written with full howledgaof the results that fol- lines in that part of the field after the death of G n -  
eral Johnston, designates this as "one of the con- 
trolling conflicts of that eventful day."" m e  
Fiald and the woods and thicket% bordering it along position was of such conspicuous importance that a 
the “&;en mad" were thickly strewn with +be brief description of the ground will not be out of 
~!#&h.;r-l, , 
Moving out on the Corinth road from the Land- 
ing about three-fourths of a mile one crosses the 
Hamburg and Savannah road. A fourth of a mile 
further on the road forks, the left-hand branch 
back9'- fom ~ v d  W, (Eastern Corinth) bearing south of southwest ; and 
son, in o~~ mpod mys o one-fourth of a mile still further on it crosses an old 
abandoned road near the southeast corner of Dun- 
can Field, and near the center of the Hornets' Nest. 
The right-hand road from the fork runs nearly 
west, crossing the north end of Duncan Field, then 
bearing south passes the "Little Log Meeting- 
house". At the point where this road, going from 
the Landing, strikes the east line of Duncan Field 
the abandoned road leads off to the southeast about 
a half-mile, then bending east to the Hamburg and 
, 
Savannah road near Bloody Pond - another sig- 
nificant local name. Along this abandoned road; 
beginning near the north end of Duncan Bield, the 
line of battle from right to left, was as follows: 
58th Illinois (Sweeny 's brigade) ; second, seventh, 
il 
l?zmnb'@ djvidon, of one m b  re@- 
~ ~ t ~ - -  the eatire &LEI P- not to .a- , 
d 2 , W m e s .  Th.eo ldroadm&ngaw& 
e1avation and was so w a t e r - w d d  h &8.h 
~didlhm, h m  right 
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admitting that "for a brief period the enemy appar- 
ently gained". Nor was he alone in the belief, for 
one of his artillery officers (Captain Bandidge) said 
officially: "I have no doubt that had they been 
seasonably reinforced when they checked our ad- 
vancing troops, they could certainly have broken 
our lines". And he feared that result before the 
guns could be planted and infan* supports 
brought up. General Ruggles succeeded in bring- 
ing up sixty-two guns from the left, which were 
planted on the west side of Duncan Yield about five 
hundred yards away ; and the bombardment began 
at  about four-thirty afternoon. Of course there 
could be but one result. The Union batteries were 
forced to retire, leaving the way clear for the en- 
circling Confederate lines to close in. Besides the 
Ruggles aggregation of artillery of sixty-two guns, 
there must have been several other batteries playing 
upon the Hornets' Nest from the right, as none of 
the guns from that part of the field were in the 
Ruggles aggregation. Probably not less than sev- 
enty-five guns were trained on that devoted spot, 
and fully three-fourths of the Confederate army 
was coiling around it. And for some time before 
the surrender took place, a few minutes before six 
o'clock, rifle-fire poured in from three directions, as 
the beleagured faced about and attempted to fight 
their way out. The number to surrender was about 
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add~rate bttery took part in the ~ ' Q h o ~ r ,  I r l  
w d  h t  wm diaMea. " ,*,,' +, 
fib-aoindtd ~IWI, h a h g  k n o ~ l d @  d 
the ohamakr of tbe p m d  batween the linm of the 
two a d w  aB the lina were on Sunday night -- MI- 
pecially m the left of the Unian lines -rmt ad- 
mit mc u1~8nt~h~ wm a ~ t i ~ n  a d  w.t  hi^. 
a n t t l g d t  had seri~m obtaclles tp evercome befam 
he oozlld m e  kth edwt. . . P.+,L , , 8 , 8 :-I 
With as little delay a~ p 
render at the HombF W 4  
eo-m the OoIs%&mh -4 odtared hi& 
and Jaehon's bri- 
advanced along the 
f lhg right, formed 
. Thb m e e ,  impam- ' 
fully i b l f ~ ~ e  from 
were tixubd md ob- 
8 .  
. - 8  
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gades and one battery participated. Chalrners's 
brigade had nominally five regiments, but one of 
the regiments (52nd Tennessee) "acted badly" in 
the early part of the day, and three hundred of its 
four hundred men are not to be counted. Jackson's 
brigade detached one regiment to guard the Horn- 
ets' Nest prisoners, so that it seems to be liberal, 
allowing for the losses of the day, to say that there 
were not to exceed 1800 men engaged in the last 
assault. 
The two brigades made their way down the south- 
ern slope, through the tangled undergrowth at  the 
bottom of the ravine and, quoting from their official 
reports, "struggled" up the other slope, "which 
was very steep" encountering in "attempting to 
mount the last ridge?' the "fire from a whole line 
of batteries protected by infantry and assisted by 
shells from the gunboats." General Chalmers says 
his men "were too much exhausted to storm the bat- 
teries". "' 
, ..d 
General Jackson says his men were without Am- 
munition, having "only their bayonets to rely on", 
and that when "they arrived near the crest of the 
opposite hill", they "could not be urged farther 
without support", the men "sheltering themselves 
against the precipitous sides of the ravine" where 
"they remained under fire for some time." " (The 
I '. " 
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" 1 Confederate skirmish line is shown on Map VI, at 
" ' the crest of the bluff, north of Dill Branch.) 
This was the situation when eight companies of 
the 36th Indiana (Colonel Grose) , about four hun- 
dred men, of Ammen's brigade, Nelson's division, 
Army of the Ohio, arrived on the scene. Colonel 
Grose was ordered to go to the support of Stone's 
battery, which was in position some distance in ad- 
vance of Grant's main line and near the brow of the 
hill up which the assailants were climbing with 
great difliculty. There the 36th Indiana exchanged 
shots with the skirmishers of Chalmers's brigade, 
during fifteen to thirty minutes 58 having one man 
killed and one man wounded. In his history of the 
36th Indiana,, Colonel Grose says that "after three 
or four  round^^ the enemy fell back. It was then 
dark." And he says, further, that "no part of 
Buell's army, except the Thirty-sixth Indiana, took 
any part whatever in the Sunday evening fight a t  
Shiloh. " And he might have said with equal truth 
and without disparagement to his regiment that the 
" '  presence of the Thirty-sixth Indiana had no effect 
in determining the iasues of the day. Had the four 
hundred mbn not been there the "enemy" would 
have retired just the same, for he could never have 
crossed the open space from the "last ridge" to the 
"line of batteries". The ground to be traversed was 
but gently rolling with little to obstruct the view - 
+ ,  - *  .. , 
I . f .  . ,  
1 '  
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no sheltering ridge or friendly copse to admit of 
unobserved approach. It must have been a "rush" 
of two to four hundred yards, in the face of point- 
blank firing, to reach the batteries, behind which, 
I as already stated, was ample infantry support. The battle of the day really came to an end at  the Hornets' Nest. All that followed was mere skir- 
, mishing for the purpose of developing the new con- 
ditions. 
THE LOST OPPORTUNmrP 
The "Lost Opportunity" is a phrase of Confed- 
erate origin and it refers to the last moments of 
Sunday's battle, briefly described above. Both the 
idea and the phrase seem to have been born of an 
afterthought, and a disposition to shift blame to 
the shoulders of General Beauregard, should 
blame be imputed, for failure to crush or capture 
Grant's army. The claim has been put forward 
with considerable persistency that the order of Gen- 
eral Beauregard to withdraw from the contest was 
responsible for the escape of Grant's army. This 
, absurd claim has been answered most effectively 
by General Thomas Jordan, Adjutant-General ok 
the Confederate forces engaged at  Shiloh. 
8 I n  Southern Historical Society Papers? General 
Jordan takes up the subject and refers to the offi- 
cial reports of several division, brigade, and regi- 
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Confederate army. I n  referring to the report of 
General Withers, two brigades of whose division 
made the last feeble assault, he says: "If there be 
sigdlcance in words, he makes it clear that such 
was the absolute lateness of the hour, that had the 
attempt been made to carry the Federal batteries 
. . . . with such troops as were there assembled, it 
would have resulted in an awful butchery and dia- 
persion of all employed in so imensate, so prepos- 
terous an undertaking ; and such mugt be the verdict 
of any military man who may stu&ously read the 
reports of the subordinate officers of Withers's 
three brigades, and bear in mind the formidable 
line of fifty-odd pieces of mtillery which Webster 
had improvised ' 
Surgeon J. C. Nott of General Bragg's staff, who 
mile by hie3 chief's side nearly all day, is quoted as 
saying that the "~lllsen .. . . . were too much demoral- 
ized and indisposed to advance in the face of- the 
shells . . . . bursting over us in every direction, and 
my impression was. . . . that our troops had done all 
that they would do, and had better be withdrawn."'" 
Another offimr of General Bragg b staff, Colonel 
Urquhart, Wl"itbg in 1880 is quoted thus: "The 
plain truth must be told, that our troops a t  the 
front were a thin line of exhausted men, who were 
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making no further headway. . . . . Several pears of 
subsequent service have impressed me that General 
Beauregard's order for withdrawing the troops was 
most timely "?O 
The claim that there was a "Lost Opportunity" 
because of the order to retire, General Jordan says, 
LLbecomes simply shameful, under the light of the 
closely contemporaneous statements of every divi- 
sion commander, except one (Wihers) ; of all the 
brigade and regimental commanders of each Con- 
federate corps, ineluding the reserve whose reports 
have reached the light ; that is, of nearly all com- 
manders present in the battle. " @l 
This ought to be sufficient evidence to settle for- 
ever both propositions in the negative ; namely, the 
claim that Buell "saved the day", and that there 
was a "Lost Opportunity ". 
The condition of Grant's army at the close of 
Sunday's battle as to strength has been greatly 
underrated by certain writers, and its disorganiza- 
tion has been greatly exaggerated by writers who 
have had an object in so representing it. It is true 
that .both armies were badly battered as the result 
of about fourteen hours' continuous fighting with 
scarcely a moment's cessation. Careful study of t h a E  
reports of Confederate officers shows that there 
was not a single point of attack on any part of the 
field at  any hour of the day where there was not 
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stubborn resistance with serious loss to the attack- 
ing forces. These reports also show that there was 
serious defection from their ranks, beginning early 
and continuing during the day, and that when night 
came on there was such disorganization that some 
of their commanders were entirely separated from 
their commands and remained so separated to the 
close of the battle, Monday night. These reports 
further show that instead of bivouacking in line of 
battle as did Grant's army the entire Confederate 
army, with the exception of a single brigade 
(Pond's brigade on the extreme left) withdrew a 
distance of two to four miles from the Landing. It 
is in evidence also from the same sources of infor- 
mation that General Beauregard was able to put in 
line on the morning of the second day substantially 
half the number of men that were in line on the 
morning of the &st day. General Grant was able 
to put in line about the same proportion, exclusive 
of the re6nforcements that came up during the 
night. 
There are no means of determining the compara- 
tive casualties in the two armies on the first day, 
but there is no reason for doubting that they were 
substantially equal - exclusive of the capture at  
the Hornets' Nest. It is known, however, that the 
casualties among field officers, from the grade of 
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colonel upward, were greater in the Union than in 
the Confederate amy in Elmby's battle* 
Much has been said about the "~trrtgglem" from 
the Union line8 crowding the Landing and "cower- 
ing" under the river bl* - and with .about the 
same degree of enggemtion as mithin writera have 
indulged in th& dmeriptriopu41 of tSne opening of 
the battle. Them mre "~bgg1em" from both 
a d ,  and thmeb m mama80 doubt Usat 
numbers were subbarn J equl. It &I m e 9  how- 
ever, that the shggbg mare in exidam on 
the Union side, for .the wiry g d  mason it m 
more ooncentmtd- confined to a h i f a d  arm 
about the Landing - while on the ~theP dde them 
waa unlimited r o m  for expwwhn and &catbring 
over miles of territory. This remark appUw with 
equal force to other features of the crowded condi- 
tion near the Landing, late in the b y .  Hundm& 
of teamsters with their four-mule and six-mule 
teams were there because it was the only place of 
0 of the amntial parts of the army's 
ie rJ.iok from the regimental hospitslrh 
tents were there - several hadre& 
------ "- ere was no other plam 4x1 go ; '
-= II-\LL- wL were there from the front, 
together with a force of hospital attemhnb. Add 
these together aad you have several thawand with- 
mge things 
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are never considered by critics who have a cause to General Wood, commanding another division of 
support. Every large army requires a small army , Buell's army, not yet arrived at  Savannah, to move 
"with the utmost dispatch to the river" at  Savan- 
BUELL COMES ON THE FIELD 
nah, where boats would meet him. The following 
note was left for General Buell whose presence in 
By General Orders of March 31st, General Savannah was not known to General Grant: 
Grant's headquarters were transferred from Sa- S a v e ,  April 6, 1862 
vannah to Pittsburg Landing; but a headquarters' General D. C. BEELL :
office was continued at  the former place for conven- Heavy flrhg is heard up the river, indicating plainly that 
ience up to the day of the battle, and General Grant an attack has been made on our most advanced positions. I have been looking for this, but did not believe that the attack 
passed between the two places every day, or nearly could be made before Monday or Tuesdw. !ChT neceseitates 
every day, on the headquarters' boat, Tigress. On 1 my joining the forces up the river instead of meeting you today, 
Sunday morning, at  Savannah, an "early break- as I had contemplated. I have directed General Nelson to 
I move to the river with his division. He can march to oppoaite fast" had been ordered, as it was General Grant's 
purpose to ride out with his staff to meet General Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Buell, whose arrival the evening before was not U. S. GRANT 
known. While a t  breakfast, firing was heard in the Major-General C~mmanding.~" 
direction of Pittsburg Landing - "the breakfast This note clearly shows that General Grant, in 
was left unfinished" and General Grant and staff common with his division commanders, was expect- 
went directly to the boat and steamed rapidly up ing an early attack. 
the river, stopping at  Crump's Landing to order As soon as General Grant, after arriving on the 
General Lew. Wallace to hold his division in readi- field, learned the true situation, he sent a staff of- 
ness for marching orders. ficer with another order to General Nelson: "you 
Before leaving Savannah General Grant sent to will hurry up your command as fast as possible. 
General Nelson of Buell's army, the following or- All looks well but it is necessary for you to push 
der : "An attack having been made on our forces, forward as fast as possible".B4 Later still, prob- 
you will move your entire command to the river op- ably about noon though it may have been later, 
posite Pittsburg"." A similar order was sent to nothing having been heard either from Buell or 
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Nelson, General Grant sent another hurry-up order one-thirty, afternoon." (Colonel Ammen says at  
addressed to the "Commanding Officer Advance ' one, afternoon.) 
Forces (Buell 's Army) ". order was delivered Vmard, heretofore quoted, says that Nelson re- 
to General Buell on the boat as he was going to the ceived Grant's order about noon, by which he prob- 
Landing. He arrived a t  the Landing, he tells us in ably means the "reiterated7' order. In any event 
Shiloh Reviewed, about 1 o'clock, though Villard, it appears that General Buell "held up" the order 
who claims to have been on the same boat, makes to Nelson fully five hours and then "reiterated" it. 
the time later, between 5 and 6 o'clock, about the Why did General Buell do that? Why did General 
time that Nelson b advance crossed the river. And Nelson wait to have the order "reiterated"8 Why 
. there are certain features of Buell's official report did he not obey the original order regardless of any 
which, in the absence of a defhite statement on the dilatory order from General Buell, since the con- 
point, make Villard's claim as to the hour at  least tingency had arisen under which by General Hal- 
plausible. leek's instructions General Grant was "authorized 
General Grant's first order to General Nelson to take the general command" of both armies; 
must have been reaeived as early as 7 o'clock- namely, an attack upon his own army? Had Gen- 
probably earlier, for N e h n  had the order era1 Nelson marched under the original order, his 
Gleneral Buell, after hearing the M g ,  went to 
'. division would have been on the field at  about the 
General Grant's headquarters for information, . time that it started on the ten-mile march. What 
where he learned that the latter had "just started ' might have been the effect of throwing 4,500 fresh 
men in the scale of battle, then hanging in doubtful 
for the Landing"."" ' poise, is, of course, conjectural - and it must be 
General Nelson in his official report does not state left to conjecture, though there is little room for 
the hour of receiving the order to march, but mys 
that he "left Savasnsh, by order of General Grant, General Nelson's entire division was across the 
reiterated by General Buell in person, a t  1.30 river soon after dark. Advancing a little to the 
m." " The language is a little ambiguous, but it front on the extreme left it bivouacked for the night. 
doubtless means that the order was "reiterated" ' A little later General Lew. Wallace came up on the 
about noon or later and that the mar& began at extreme right, his division numbering about 5,000 
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men; but having to counter-march the division in 
order to bring the regiments in proper position 
his formation was not completed until after mid- 
night when it went into bivouack. 
During Sunday night Crittenden's division of 
Buell's army (two brigades) came up by boat, and 
in the morning two brigades of McCook's division 
arrived, to be joined about noon by another brigade. 
Wood's division, which was about thirty miles 
away when the battle began, arrived on the field at  
about two afternoon Monday, when the battle was 
about over. The total additions to the Union lines 
up to noon on Monday was approximately 20,000 
men. 
During Sunday's battle General Grant passed 
from point to point behind the firing line, meeting 
and consulting with his division commanders and 
carefully observing the movements of the contend- 
ing forces, for, as has already been stated, there was ! 
no point on the field from which general observa- 
tions could be made. On Monday he commanded 
his own army, giving no orders to Gneral Buell, 
the latter exercising independent command. Why 
General Grant did not assume "general command" 
of both armies we might fairly conjecture (if con- 
jecture were necessary) to be due to the attitude of 
General Buell toward Grant's order to Nelson on 
Sunday morning - treating it as invalid until "re- 
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jecture in the matter, however, for General Buell ,. 
says in his ShdZoh Reviewed " : "I did not look . 
upon him [Grant] as my commander". There is 
evidence also that Buell was disposed to treat the 
subject of Sunday's battle as something of a sham 
-that the resistance to the Confederate attacks 
was not particularly strenuous. General Tuttle of 
Grant's army, acted on Monday as reserve to Gen- 
eral Buell, having under his command the two Iowa 
Regiments that cut their way out of the Hornets' 
Nest on 8unday, and one or two other regiments of 
Grant's army. General Tuttle relates that "while 
passing over the field, April 7th'; following up the 
advancing lines, "General Buell taunted me with 
not having done any fighting that amounted to any- 
thing [on Sunday]." When @ey came to the 
"clearing" in front of the Hornets' Nest and saw 
the ground strewn with dead, Buell "was compelled 
to confess that there must have been terrible fight- 
ing". Had General Buell passed over the ground 
at  the Peach Orchard and over the slope in froqt 
of Sherman's first line, he would have found sim- 
ilar conditions to those in the "clearing" in front of 
the Hornets' Nest. His estimate of the vigor of the 
Confederate attacks on Sunday was probably based 
upon the. feeble attack made by exhausted men 
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p p s &  he himsele saw near the Landing on ized the movements of the Confederate lines on 
*= 
Sunday - the figure of the "Alpine avalanchew 
] ~ n  Monday's battle Gteneml Buelf's a m y  o ~ ~ t i -  would not apply to the movements of either day. 
t&d the left and General ~rmt 's  the right, However, the Union lines moved forward without 
k e r n 1  Lew. Wallace's fresh division 0 ~ ~ P i n g  serious repulses a t  any point, though there were 
some reverses on the left. The Confederate4 held 
their ground with stubbornness, occupying the line 
were mnt before tbe battle was O T @ ~  the actreme of the Purdy road until about noon. By two o'clock 
and one of them, under c o m d  of GIened the battle was practically over, and an hour later 
the Confederates were in full retreat. Map No. 
VII will give a good idea of the general movements 
m d  near i2-w center, aapbd r bathv. on Monday- There was no general pursuit of the 
defeated army - just enough to be sure that it was 
to "reiterate" the a retreat in fact. The lack of pursuit was not, how- 
ever, beesuse Grant lacked "the energy to order a 
&age aimxsios to the pursuit", as John aodman Ropes alleges, but be- 
cause Halleck's instructions did not p e h t  pur- 
@I & d d e r & b  wesg able suit ; " hands were still "tied". 
9 G m t  had instructed his NUMBER8 ENQAGED AND LOSSES 
o l ~ r  8mhy night to be reetdy 
mo&g, and General Buell mere  are two methods of estimating the strength 
of an army - one method excludes all noncombat- 
* bepn nearly at  the ants, the other includes noncombatants as essential 
five-- on fhe erne park of the army. On the inclusive method, the 
Historian and Secretary of the Shiloh National 
in c o n k t  until atbut eight; o'clock It wmkI no* be U t a r y  Park Commission " gives the strength of 
co-t to hm&*-the movmenb of &e Grant's five divisions on Sunday a t  39,830, and that 
lina on Momby w h e m 1  lk=~re@ ~ ~ ~ r -  of Johnston's army at 43,968." In a note " in which 
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he excludes noncombatants, the estimate is 33,000 
and 40,000 respectively. The figures last given cor- 
respond with the estimates of the two commanders 
- Grant in his Memoirs, and Johnston in his dis- 
patch from, Corinth, when about to march. In 
artillery, Johnston had one hundred and twenty- 
eight guns and Grant one hundred and twelve. Had 
Wallace's division come upon the field early on 
Sunday the two armies would have been very evenly 
matched, both in men and guns. On the second day, 
including noncombatants and ' 'stragglers ", the 
34,000.'* The complete and accurate losses of the 
respective armies for the respective days have never 
been, and cannot be, stated. The losses of Grant's 
army by divisions, two days (except 3d division one 
day) were as follows : 
Killed Wounded Prisonera Totd 
Ist divirdon, MeClmmd . . 285 1,372 85 1,742 
2nd " W. H. L. WsUace 270 1,173 1,306 2,749 
3rd " Lew. W W e  . 41 251 
4th " Hnrlbut . . .  317 1,441 111 1,869 
5th " Sheman . . .  325 1,277 299 1,901 
6th " Prentb . . .  236 928 1,008 2,172 
U n a s s i g n e d . .  . . . . .  39 159 17 215 
----  
Total Array Tenn. . . . . .  1,513 6,601 2,830 10,944-14 
Army of the Ohio, Monday--16 
2nd division . . . . . .  88 823 
4th " . . . . . .  93 603 20 716 
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Killed Wounded Prisonerr Total 
e 
5th " . . . . . .  60 377 28 465 
6th " . . . . . .  . . 4 .. 4 
----  
Total . . . . . . . . .  241 1,807 55 2,103 
Grand total . . . . . . .  1,754 8,408 2,885 13,047 
APXU~ of Miss. (Confederate) 1,728 8,012 959 10,69976 I The killed in the two days' battle are almost ex- actly equal; the wounded are in excess by nearly four hundred, in the Union army; and there was in 
the Union army an excess in prisoners, of 1,926. 
C Eliminating the prisoners taken in the Hornets' Nest, it appears that more prisoners were taken in 
the open field by the Union army than by the Con- 
I 
I federates. The loss in officers in Grant's army on 
Sunday from the grade of colonel up was much 
heavier than in the Confederate army - forty-five 
in the former to thirty in the latter." 
f 5 8 , . 
THE LOST DIVISION ' . ' ' 
So much has been written and said about the fail- 
ure of General Wallace to get his division on the 
I field and into the fight on the first day of the battle 
that the subject deserves a separate paragraph and 
L a map of the roads over which his division marchedr 
By reference to the map (No. VIII) it will be seen 
that the division occupied three camps - one bri- 
gade a t  Crump's Landing ; one at  Stonylonesome, i' two to three miles west; and one at  Adalllsille, 
! about five miles out from the Landing toward 
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M y .  Were is no &pula about the fact tbit ' 
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time at  "about nine o'clock".7s General Grant and 
port, lmving it to be inferred that he had no order 
from Grant in the morning. He says that from the 
"continuous o&~onading" he "inferred a general 
battle" ; that he was in "anticipation of an order" ; 
dnd that he ordered his &st and tW brigades to 
' 'concentrate ' on the second at  8baylonesome." 
In I& Autobiogmphg & n e d  W a r n  m p  that he 
was Sam& before six 0 fdm!k, i?twm &@ M n g  "llp 
the river': that the be* am oli.; and be says that 
at about seven oY&& I& maagg.ation of brigdes 
began. The &&;1 that thh o r d e ~  
wag 1 .  ardd a* ih 4 % ~  W d  brigade did not 
ma abut two-thirty after- 
bddncl the first and second 
h n r d  b a k e  Creek bridge, a 
~hnylonemme~ 
the Battle of LJhiloh, G)ened , 
to refer to the movements of . 
r the reasons for the lata- ! 
ness of hh mdmil an the field; and ip Bia explana-. 8'1 
tion he ins:i&Wy referred to GCmmtp~ all at  *I, 
Grump's Ian- an 8unday morning, hing the ; 
No special importance is to be attached to this 
difference in time, however, for it had no important I f - -  
which he received 8nal marching orders; namely, 
"11:30 a. m." It was the belief of General Grant 
and members of his staff that the order must have 
: been received from a half hour to an hour earlier; 
though General Wallace's statement is now gener- 
ally accepted. The form of order sent to Wallace 
can never be definitely settled, as it is nowhere a 
matter of record, and the original was lost in the 
u m g  the year after the Battle of Shiloh, there 
was mueh criticism of General Wallace, to which 
he, of course, made defence. And so General Grant 
gineer, and Captain Rowley of his staff, each of 
whom had knowledge of General Wallace's move- 
ments on Sunday, to write out in detail their recol- 
lections, to be submitted to the Department Com- 
' mander. Each wrote quite fully about one year 
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after the battle, Oolonel Rawlins reproducing from 
memory the order dictated by him as he claims, to 
Captain Baxter, which order was carried by the 
latter to Wallace. Following is the order from j 
memory : 
MAJoR-GENI~~~ W A ~ A U E  : - - 
You will move forward your division from Cnunp's Land- 
ing, leaving a d c i e n t  force to protect the public propem at 
that place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to and 
. -  - . - - . r. A .-LA ---I-- 2 4 , .  &,.,,
parallel with the river, ana rorm m ~lne m n g n ~  curgmr~ WAW ww 
river, immediately in rear of the camp of Maj. GFen. C. F. 
kith'fl division on our right, and there await further ordemsO 
- Captain Baxter started by ba t  to deliver tha , 
order "not later than nine o'clock'', according to 
Colonel Rawlins, and reported back to Grant before 
ticipated order arrived, directing me to come u p  
and take position on the right of the army and fornr; 
my line of battle at  a rigb 
,Writing a. year later to General Halleck, e x p l a w  
,, 
' 
'the reasom for his late arrival on the field, he s& 
"At exactly 11 :30 a. m., a quartermaster by 4 
name of BaXter brought me an order in writing 
signed by wbodg", the bearer of the order 
plaining that he received it verbally and put it 1 
writing: while on the boat. : 4 G )  
somewhat on tpe subject of this order, and says that 
it was written on paper diemlored with tobacco 
stains and bore the imprint of boot-heels; and he 
says that Baxter told him that the paper was picked 
up from the floor of the ladies* cabin, on the stetwrr- 
boat. The original order having-be& lo&, Wallace 
gives the following from memory : 
You wiZl leave a mfhient foree at Ckmpycr Lmding to 
&agld the publie pmpwty them: with the mat o# the diam 
msrch and form jmotion with the ut d the army. Pam 
line of battle at right tingle8 with the river, a d  be governed 
by dm--." 
The Bawlins f orq  of order 'was reproduced from 
- 
memory within one yetq after the e m t ;  tbnt of 
"12 o'clock m." Wallace, m y  yegla after - poseibly for@ 
his ofi&.l report, dated April 12,1862' Aside from the precise road mentiow and tbe pre- 
p -- ,. . . r-. fir. - 1  't L1-- -- c k  position on the field designated in the & w b  
order, the two are s.brikingly similar-dcimtly 
80 to suggest that the former, which had long beem 
t angle with the river. " in print, may *have been consulted to refresh the, 
mmory in prepa* the latter. : I yld,+/ 
rring again to the events of Sunday as nc 
by Colonel Bawlins, it appears that about an 
after Captain Baxter started by b a t  w3th 
rs to General Wallace, Grant sent a cavalry 
aer, frrmiliar withthe road, with a verbs1 message 
ce "to hmry forward with all padb1e &is- 
" This officer reported back to Grant, be- 
& about 12 oS&& ; 
tibat he d~livered the o to W d a c e a + a b a u t b  , 
d him by Capbin J k b r  and "appeared th- 
lighted ".ee 
linmdiably after the r e p &  of &e c a v e  of- 
' 
after hearing the re- 
a d  said : "Caphh, 
\ 
- - - -3. 
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with the further instruction: "see that you do not 
I spare horse f l e ~ h . " ~  Captain Rowley gives the 
time of his starting on this mission at  about twelve- 
thirty o'clock. Colonel Rawlins fixes it at  "not later 
: than 1 o'clock p. m." 
: Cap& Rowley's party rode directly to Wal- 
lace's headquarters at  Crump's Landing, to h d  
"no signs of a camp except one baggage wagon 
that was just leaving. " " (The brigade had marched 
west to Btonylonesome in the morning.) Getting 
directions from the driver of the wagon, the party 
followed the road taken by Wallace and overtook 
the rear of the division some five or six miles out. 
The division was "at a rest, sitting on each side of 
the road". Riding forward to the head of the col- 
umn, Wallace was found "sitting upon his horse, 
surrounded by his stati". Although it is not so 
, stated, it is fair to assume that the division was at  
' 
rest while the cavalry was scouting to the front, as 
Wallace believed that he was approaching the 
crossing of Owl Creek, near the right of the army 
as it was in the morning, and where he might ex- 
pect trouble. 
Captain Rowley delivered his orders and stated 
that it had been reported to Grant that he (Wal- 
lace) had declined to march without written orders, 
which according to Rowley, Walace denounckd as 
a "damned lie 1'' Wallace claimed that he had taken 
the '' only road he knew anything about, " "' leading 
in the direction of the right of the army. On learn- 
ing the real situatian, Wallace ordered his division 
to counter-march for the purpose of reaching the 
river road by a short-cut if possible. Captain Row- 
ley remained with the division, acting as guide. 
When Captain Rowley left the field with orders 
to Wallace, it was supposed that the head of the 
column would be found only a short distance north 
of b a k e  Creek bridge, and that Wallace would 
soon be in the precise position where he was expect- 
ed to be, and where his presence was most needed. 
Two o'clock came, but no information from Wal- 
lace. Grant then sent two of the principal members 
of his staff, Colonel Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant 
General, and Colonel McPherson, Chief Engineer, 
to find the lost division. - L ,  - Y  rM: 
These officers rode directly to C w p ' s  Landing, 
not Imowhg whether the division had left its camp. 
Pollowing directions given thep there, they came 
upon the division counter-marching on a cross-road 
to the river road, at  about three-thirty afternoon. 
Colonel Rawlins repeated to Wallace the reported 
refusal to march without written orders, and Wal- 
lace repeated the denial. In regard to the road 
' taken, Wallace said, according to Rawlins, that his 
guide had misled him. 
Soon after Rawlins and McPherson came up with 
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states it, &'for a a ~ d e r a b 1 l e  length of time, to erm- 
able it to olosg up and rest". TBert3 was 8120th~ 
deby when near ~ n a t e  mli bridge "fm f a  h . ~  
Tbe k a e  doem, & w b ,  H f i m ~ ,  and I &ouley, agree in tidating that the oi the ml- 
s m d  to have q p  efiht. 
; the 8 p d  was 1- W f l a  
afhw he joined the 00- 
in fhe condition; he was m 
wiaa in buoywt &pirib, .. . . and mgte dm gat fdr- 
- 
Whatever the form df the or& tkoa WaemX 
8 m t  ks General WaZlaee, and however it m y  have 
beem hh.pmt% Wahlcre's mreh began f r m  
8 b n y l o n m a  at fmdae oSdoc$ won, with tW6 
ley came up to the bead of the column ""t 
north of and @*82"100lring C l m  h d k  *May, ntst 
Owl Om& M W&hee supposed - he wm skill m o ~ e  
than t h e e  d m  from Owl CPeek, and reta~p o-f 
the aolnmn was stil l  at Adamvills. The cou11te~- 
maroh, began from the north side of Clear Cmk, at  
a pint marked b'Bmith's" (Map VIIT). It wag 
neaessary for the head of the column to mrvab back ,,! 
about two and a half miles to find a cross-ma& then .( 
about the saane clidance on the cross-road.,.befom " 
the rear could move; so it was well along in the af- A: 
tern009 when the last files of the third brigade left 
Adamsville. Colonel Rawlins and Colonel Mc- i 
Phemn came up with Wallace on the omas-road at 
about i h m e - w  afternoon, dtrr hes?etofore state&. 
, , the army (m It ms ~~y mo-g) ww 
1 i 8 ,  , Uxwk bridge ( W b k  
tslR road by Ow1 : 
, but the cr&g ' 
enemy succeeded in M- . 
a battery, for rths 
through a swampy 
m&p, 8 ~ w  t&abd and with dense mdet- 
gmw4& a mrxpw d where deployment 
wa Imgto&ler mid where the eolu~tlzp would be ex- , 
G M ~ e r y  &re for a distaam of nearly 
a mile. 
Wallace been faaoiliar with the 
1 
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province to guard, no guide could have misled him, 
and he would not have said that he was on "the on@ 
rod  he knew anything about". His position a t  
Grump's Landing was as much exposed to attack as 
was the camp at  Pitkburg Landing, and he was as 
likely to need support as he was to be called on for 
aupport. It was of the uhnost importance for the 
safety of his own command that he know the short- 
est and best road between the two camps. 
Forty years after the event General Wallace was 
forced to confess that he had all that time been la- 
boring under a mistake as to the position of the 
head of his column when the order was given to 
counter-march. He had all this time supposed that 
he was overlooking Owl Creek at  the right of Sher- 
man's lines when Captain Rowley came up and 
found his &vision "at rest", while hie cavalry was 
scouting to the front. Instead of overlooking Owl 
Creek, he was overlooking the valley of Clear Creek 
three or four miles to the north. Of these facts 
General Wallace was convinced, not long before his 
death, by a personal inspection of the territory and 
the roads over which his division marched, in com- 
pany with the Secretary and Historian of the Bhiloh 
National Military Park Commission, several of his 
own officers, with citizens living in the locality, and 
with a Confederate cavalry officer who was watching 
his movements on that Sunday. 
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it was the promptings of General Grant's generous 
nature, rather than the contents of the letter that 
prompted the foot-note. It is not entirely clear, in 
view of the admissions made by General Wallace ' 
in his Autobiography, that the letter from General 
Lew. Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace does 
not furnish additional ground for censure. At the 
moment of writing the l e t t e~  the author of it must 
have been ' ' simmering " in his mind the knowledge 
that the Confederate army was then on the march 
to attack Grant; and yet there was no mention in 
the letter of that important fact. The reader must 
draw his own conclusions. 
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for failure of, to pursue Con- 
federates, 89; number of troops 
in army of, 89, 90; losses in 
army of, 90, 91; orders to Wal- 
lace from, 92-99; criticism of 
Wallace by, 102; modillcation of 
criticisms by, 102; generosity of, 
103 
Greeley, Horace, errors in account 
of Battle of Shiloh by, 13 
Grose, Colonel William, statements 
by, 76 
-EX, William J., aeknowledg- 
ments to, 11 
Halleck, General Henry W., report 
by, 14; waiting policy of, 15; 
reference to, 23,24,31,34,36,37, 
85, 94; communications between 
BueU and, 25; desire of, for 
mom troops, 25, 26; disggree- 
ment between Buell and, 27, 28; 
command of two departments se- 
amed by, 28; orders to Grant 
from, 28, 29, 32, 33, 38; orders 
to  Buell from, 35, 36; adherence 
to order8 of, 44, 45 ; effect of in- 
atructiom of, 89 
Hamburg and Purdy road, 50, 57 
Hamburg and Savanah road, 50, 
51, 66, 69, 72, 73 
Hardcastle, Major Aaron B., ac- 
count of eldrmish by, 53, 64 
Hardee, General Willism J., corh  
oommasded by, 59 
Harris, Governor Ieham G., 65 
Headley, Joel Tyler, e ~ o r s  in his- 
tory by, 14 
Henderson, David B., 6 
Hildebrand, Colonel Jesee, brigade 
commanded by, 58, 59, 60 
8 8 ,  
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Hindman, Qeneral Thomas C., bri- 
gade commanded by, 68 
Holman, T. W., acknowledgments 
to, 11 
Hornets' Nest, Lwa troops in, 5; 
errors relative to, 19; reference 
to, 64, 80, 87; description of 
fight at, 67-72; number eaptured 
in, 71, 72; importance of, 72; 
surprise of Confederates a t  small 
number in, 72; prisonera taken 
in, 91; death of Powell at, 120 
Humboldt (Ternwee), 29 
Hurlbut, General Stephen A., divi- 
don commanded by, 31, 32; ref- 
erence to, 50, 62, 64, 65, 66; 
l oaw  in division commbnded by, 
90 
ILLINOIS, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 40, 61, 63, 6 4  69 
Indiana, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 73, 96 
Iowa, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 5, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 87 
of, 89, 90; losses in army of, 90, 
91 
Johnston, William Preston, state- 
ments by, 67, 68 
Jonea's .Field, 64 
Jordan, Colonel Thomas, disouesion 
of "lost opportunity" by, 77, 
78, 79 
KINO, Major John H., wound re- 
ceived by, 55 
LAIJMAN, General Jacob D., brigade 
commanded by, 62 
Lick Creek, croasing of, 57; ref- 
erence to, 61 
Little Log Meeting House, 69 
MCARTHW, General John, brigade 
commanded by, 63; reference to, 
65, 66 
McClellan, General h r g e  B., 25, 
28 
McClernand, General John A., 15, 
62, 63, 66; divieion commanded 
JaogSoN, hnera l  John K., brigade 
wmmanded by, 61,62, 65, 74, 75 
Jackeon (Tennessee), 29, 31 
Johnson, General Bushrod B., bri- 
gade commanded by, 60 
Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 
criticilrm of, 16, 50; death of, 
18, 19, 66, 66; errora in state- 
ments relative to, 19; command 
of Confederatea mumed by, 27, 
51; reference to, 28; concentra- 
tion of army under, 36; plan of, 
to join Be~uwgmd, 51; Confed- 
erate movements directed by, 62; 
story concerning, 65; biography 
of, 67; number of troops in army 
by, 32, 60; losses in divis'in 
commanded by, 90 
McCook, General Alexander M., 
division commanded by, 86 
McDowell, Colonel John A, brigade 
commanded by, 60 
McPheraon, Colonel Jam- B., 41, 
47, 93, 100; o rdm to Wallace 
d e d  by, 98, 99 
Msnn, Lieutenant, wound received 
by, 55 
Maeon, Colonel Fbdney, 61 
Memphis and Charleston Bgilroad, 
27, 31, 34, 51 
Michigan, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 55 
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Miller, Colonel M.adhon, brigade 
commanded by, 55 
Miseiesippi, troope of, in Battle of 
Sbiloh, 59 
Missouri, t roo~s  of. in Battle of 
&fobhe and Ohio Bailroad, 27, 30 
Moore, Colonel David, wijnf orcing 
party under, 52, 53, 54; wound 
received by, 55 
Morton, General Charles, 7, 120 
NASHVILLE (Ternwee), 25, 28; 
mupation of, 26, 27; evacua- 
tion of, 27, 51; Buell on march 
from, 51 
Neal, W. A,, account of action of 
Peabody by, 42 
Nelson, Ueneral Willism, division 
commanded by, 16, 19, 26, 36, 
37, 76, 85; number of troops 
brought into battle by, 17; state- 
ments by, conwming artillery, 
73; GIrant'e instructions to, 82, 
83, 84, 85: reference to, 86; 
charge by regiment under, 88; 
itinerary of march of, 119 
Newhard, Jam= M., amount of ac- 
tion of Peabody by, 42 
Nichols, Captain F. C., letter to 
Peabody from, 43, 44; reference 
to, 53 
Nott, Surgeon J. C., stateanent by, 
78 
OHIO, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 40, 58, 59, 61 
Ohio, Army of the, 76; l oms  in, 
90, 91 
Owl Creek, 49, 57, 60, 61, 97, 99, 
100, 101 
G &  
Panoom (Kentucky), expedition 
to, 22; refemnce to, 23 
Paris, Comte de, account of Battle 
of Shiloh by, 17 
Paris (Tenneesee), 29 
Peabody, Colonel Everett, 11; re- 
connoitering party sent out by, 
42, 43, 52; death of, 43, 66; 
reprimand to, by Prmtise, 43, 
44, 45; brigade commanded by, 
55 
Peabody, F. E., letter to, 43, 44 
Peach Orchard, 62, 64, 66, 87 
Pittsburg Landing, drat regiment 
to disembark at, 5; description 
of camp at, 13; ranking oacer 
at, 15; reference to, 18, 34, 36, 
101, 123; Army of the Tennessee 
at, 81; attack on camp at, 30; 
troops in camp at, 31, 47; re& 
som for conditionti at, 35; B u d  
ordered to concentrate at, 36; 
description of, 49, 50; Sher- 
man's division in camp at, 57; 
plan of Confederates to seize, 
61; Wallace's divieion at, 63; 
Grant 's headquartere moved to, 
82; arrival of %ell at, 84 
Polk, General Leonidaa, 60 
Pond, Colonel Preston, Jr., brigade 
commmded by, 60 
Powell, Major J a m  E., 11; death 
of, 43, 56, 120; reconnoitering 
party led by, 43, 52-54 
Prentiee, General Benjsmin Y., 
division commanded by, 13, 50, 
62, 64, 66; reference to, 14, 16, 
18, 42, 48, 55, 57, 59, 70; re- 
connoitering party sent out from 
division under, 15, 52; recon- 
noitering party sent out without 
knowledge of, 42; Peabody rep- 
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rimanded by, 43, 44, 45; readi- at, 35; Buell ordered to eon- 
miss of division under, for at- centrate at, 36; departme of 
tack, 44, 45; losew in division couriers from, 36; amival of 
commanded by, 90 Buell at, 37; failure of Buell to 
Surdy road, 89 report arrival at, 38; Grant's 
headquarters moved from, 82 8 8  
RAWLINE, Captain J. A., 93, 95, Saxe, Captain Edward, death of, 
96, 97, 100, 123; order repro- 55 
d d  by, 94; orders to Wallace Scribner Brothers, errors in hit+ 
carried by, 98, 99 tory published by, 13 
Reed, D. W., 6, 120; researches Seay Field, 53, 55 
by, 10; aclrnowledgments to, 11; Shambaugh, Benj. I?., editor's in- 
d d p t i o n  of battle a t  Hornets7 troduction by, 5 
NesC by, 68, 69 Shaver, Colonel R. G., brigade com- 
Reid, Whitelaw, praise of Buell by, manded by, 55, 56 
17, 18 Sherman, Bnren I&., 6 
Ehea Field, 53, 55, 58 Sherman, Ueneral William T., divi- I: 
Rid, Joseph W., quali5cations of, don commanded by, 13, 16, 18, 1 
for writing history of battle, 6, 31, 32, 39, 40, 42, 57, 58; ref- y 
7; author's preface by, 9 erence to, 14, 15, 44, 45, 62, 66, 
John w, errors in m- 87; orderly of, killed, 58; at- 
o o t  of Battle of Shiloh by, 14, tmk upon ~ d a . ,  59-62; 
89; fdm of, to m d e r ~ b d  10- in divieion c o m n d d  by, 
ried by, 96-98 
Rugglea, General Daniel, command 
accounts of, 13-21; relation of, 
- h statsment to other m i l i t y  opsmtionq 21- 
69; artillery called up by, 70, 71 
Rnmsey, Captain I. P., account of 27; events pmcedbg, 27, 38-47; ' 
events preceding battle by, 41 condition of Union army at, 47, 
&mll, Coloml B. M., brigade 48; amription of 'eld 48- 
commanded by, 60 51; description of, 52-89; first 
Union officer killed in, 55; part 
ST. LOUIE, h&qmr tas  of Fre- pIrryed by 72-77; ' 'lost 
mont at, 22; reference to, 28, 30 OPP~WQ" of Confederates 
Sanhdge, Captain L. D., 71 in, 77-79; numbers engaged and 
Sawnnah ( T e n e e ) ,  SmithJa lossea in, 89-91; c r i t i h  of 
headquarters at, 30; reference Wallace's conduct at, 102, 103; 
to, 32, 47, 83; t roop at, 32; m a p  illustrative of, 107-114 
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Shiloh National Military Park side of, 48, 49; ~WRcnlty of 
Commission, map prepared by, 9 crossing, 49 
8hunpike road, 99 Thompson, Atwell, battle-field plat- ' ,i 
Smith, General Charles F., expedi- ted by, 10 
tion commanded by, 23, 24, 29, Trabue, Colonel Robert p., brigade 
30; report by, 30, 31; reference commanded by, 64 
to, 32, 63, 94; difkulty of ex- Tuttle, &nerd James M., brigade 
pedition of, 34 commanded by, 63, 66, 70; ref- 
Snake Creek, 46, 47, 49, 63, 72, 92, erence to, 67; statements by, 87 
96, 98, 99, 100 
Spain Field, 55 UNION army, occupation of Naeh- 
Statham, Colonel Winfield S., bri- ville by, 27; condition of, 47, 
gade commanded by, 62, 64, 65 48 ; readinem of, for attack, 56, 
Stephens, Colonel William H., bri- 57; Iwt att& upon, 74-76; 
gade commanded by, 63, 65 casualties among officers in, 80, 
Stewart, General Alexander P., 81; stragglers from, 81, 82; total 
brigade commanded by, 68 reenforcements to, 86; number 
Stibbs, John H., 7 of troopa in, 89, 90; loeees in, 
Stone, Major William M., 6 90, 91 
ston~lonesome (Temmasee), bri- Urquhart, Colonel David, statement 
gade of Wallace's diviaion at, by, 78, 79 
91; reference to. 92: b e g i m i ~ ~  
v - 
w-' DO VEA~PCH, C010nel Jamt~ c., brigade 
Staart, Colonel David, 16, 63, 65; commanded by, 62 
brigade commsnded 57, Villard, Henrg, errors in account 
wound received by, 66 
of Battle of Shiloh by, 17; ref- Sunken road, 63, 68; dewription 
of, 89, 70 erence to, 84, 85 
Sweaty, Colonel Thomas W., bri- 
gade commanded by, 63, 66, 69, 
70 
TENNESSEE, troops of, in Battle of 
Shiloh, 75 
Tennessee, Army of the, operations 
of, 21; condition of, 47, 48; 
10- in, 90 
Tenneesee River, importance of line 
of, 21-23, 28; expedition up, 29; 
troops on weet eiae of, 32; coun- 
try west of, in handa of Con- 
federates, 34; plateau on east 
WALLACE, @nerd Lew., number of 
troops brought into battle by, 
17; errors in account of Battle 
of Shiloh by, 18, 19; diviaion 
commanded by, 19, 30, 32, 63, , 
88; statements by, 31, 32; 
knowledge of attack poseegeed 
by, 45, 46; failure of, to inform 
Grant of atkclr, 46, 47; refer- 
ence to, 60, 72; Grant's orders 
to, 82; arrival of, 85; losees in 
division commanded by, 90; late 
arrival of diviaion of, 91-103 ; 
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criticism of, 93; march of divi- Webeter, Colonel J. D., artillery 
aion under, 99-101; oourt of in- of, 78 
quiry requested by, 102; request WiUbm~, Colonel Nelson G., bri- 
withdrawn by, 102; letter writ- gade commanded by, 62 
ten by, 102, 103; ordera carried Wisconsin, troops of, in  Battle of 
to, by Baxter, 123 Shiloh, 55 
Wallace, &nerd William H. L., Withers, General Jonea M., divi- 
wound received by, 18; refer- sion commanded by, 74, 78, 79 
ence to, 41, 50; d i d i o n  cam- Wood, General Sterling A. M., bri- 
manded by, 63; order8 by, 67; gade commanded by, 55, 5 4  60 
death of, 67; loaee8 in divisi~n Wood, General Thomas J., Grant's 
commanded by, 90; letter from order6 to, 83; division command- 
Lew. Wallace to, 102, 103 ed by, 86 
Waynesboro (Tennessee), desire Woodyard, Lieutenant Colonel 
of Buell to camp at, 35 Humphrey M., 54 




